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Staying Safe: Security Resources for Human Rights Defenders
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Note: This dialogue is PUBLIC. Do not share any private or sensitive information. For advice on a specific situation, please contact a participant privately.


The featured resource practitioners for this dialogue include:

  • Jane Barry - author of Insiste, Persiste, Resiste, Existe: Women Human Rights Defenders Security Strategies (with Vahida Nainar)
  • Wojtek Bogusz of Frontline Defenders
  • Rick P. Ruiz - President of VaultletSoft and initiator of Project Autonomy
  • Marie Caraj of Protection International
  • Edna Aquino of Stop Stoning and Killing Women Campaign
  • Sarah Willcox of the Scholar Rescue Fund
  • Saira Hamidi of the Urgent Action Fund
  • Jackie Nolley Echegaray from JASS (Just Associates)
  • Michele Braley and Nils Dybvig - former Christian Peacemaker Team members, provided unarmed accompaniment to human rights defenders in Colombia
  • Ali Palh of RightsNow Pakistan
  • Allen Gunn (AKA Gunner) - Executive Director of Aspiration and Ruckus Society board member

[Photo credit: hennings]


Summary

In this dialogue, practitioners that work with human rights defenders developing security strategies discussed how human rights defenders and organizations can improve their safety and security while working in the field under oppressive conditions and under the watchful eye of states and adversaries. Specifically, the participants discussed and shared tactics, strategies and resources on how human rights defenders can create effective security protocols to protect themselves against physical threats and secure their data in the field or office.

Who is a Human Rights Defender (HRD) and what is security for HRDs? Why does security matter?

A human rights defender (HRD) was defined as a person who acceptances the universality of human rights, are defined and accepted according to the rights they are defending and according to their own right to do so, and whose actions are peaceful. HRDs consciously take on risk through their work, thus human rights work might by its definition be about giving up some security.

Security and safety for HRDs is essential to their work: “The key to thinking about security/safety and well-being is first recognizing that we are as valuable as human beings as the human rights work -- and as the people we are fighting for.” A silenced human rights worker, through kidnapping, jailing or intimidation, means a human rights worker not doing their work.  Protecting human rights defenders doesn’t always mean protecting them against physical violence. “slander, smear campaigns, stigmatisation, etc are all serious threats to defenders.”

There are many “non-traditional” HRDs, such as artists, academics and activists, that don’t self identify as a HRDs. They may be unaware they are entitled to protection and one participant suggested they should be informed that they are entitled to the title of human rights defender and that they there is a protection framework that is mandated to support them.

What impact does a defender’s gender (or identity) have on security?

Among LGBT human rights defenders there many challenges to developing effective security measures because many LGBT organizations are marginalized. Lack of funding for LGBT human rights work exacerbates competitiveness between organizations which hinders the creation of strong networks necessary for security. Furthermore because the prejudice and discrimination of people in the LGBT community is based on a moral argument that permeates society many “mainstream” HRDs shy away from issues affecting this community.

One story shared was about how the security of female HRDs in Pakistan increased and threats from their colleagues were reduced when respected male members of society came out using the media in favor of women in leadership roles. Religious leaders signing statements that said Islam does not bar women from taking leadership positions improved female HRDs standing and security in their communities and families.

How does security relate to information, communication and technology?

Ensuring the safety and security of records, resources, and information is essential to preserving HRDs safety and security. Everything done online, on a computer, or with something that involves transmitted data, whether analog or digital, is recordable, copyable, transferable, morphable and redistributable. And thus security considerations should be ubiquitous in all discussions relating to any of the above

Using open source software (software where the programming code is open to the public to verify its security) is the best way to share and disseminate tools and protocols when these very tools and protocols must be shared through often unprotected, unencrypted means. Following best practices with proven tools and platforms, and showing others how to do the same is an example of “hiding in plain site.”

When a group of HRDs are working together, it is important that everyone is communicating using secure measures. If one person in a group of people communicating does not follow recommended security protocols, they can expose the whole group and their clients.

With the many digital security tools available HRDs should incorporate digital security into their larger protection plans and see how it fits into their work. Some HRDs might need or want more or less digital security depending on their situation. Some are mystified at all the choices and need help deciding what tools to use.

The security of VoIP (voice over internet protocol) services like Skype depends on a host on variables and there is no silver bullet. Nothing is totally secure but participants offered a number of helpful suggestions to improve the security of VoIP calls.

For many HRDs in the developing world the only way to access the internet is through internet cafes, which can be insecure. One contributor stressed that choosing a café where you can use your own laptop which has security software on it is an effective way to stay secure. Other tips for staying secure in an Internet Café were added here. Participants gave valuable recommendations on email services that can be trusted and the many factors to consider when choosing an email service to ensure security, here and here.

What can defenders do to protect themselves?

As a starting point new employees of human rights organizations should be informed of the risks involved in human rights work.

Self defense can be defined as a set of physical, psychological, and verbal techniques that can be used to defend one self in situations where one may be a target of verbal assault, physical abuse, or rape. It also involves knowing how to avoiding certain situations where we know we may be hurt.”  Self defense need not to be aggressive, a special art or a mystery. Many HRDs on the front lines instinctually use various methods of self defense against physical violence, verbal abuse or harassment. Sometimes running away is the best defense.

In a number of countries human rights organizations have come together to create joint initiatives focused on HRD protection and this can be an important source of joint training; relocation and emergency funds; and national and international advocacy.

Many organizations and networks of activists use secondary protests at police stations after an activist has been arrested at a rally or while doing human rights work.

Using social media and mobile phones for protection can be dangerous and insecure but in certain situations they can also be used by defenders to broadcast if they are in trouble. Sometimes making a case public or informing your network of your locations can increase your security.  Another way HRDs can use mobile phones is while traveling to check in daily with their organizations. It is best not to talk about specifics such as location when checking in and to use a set of code words because mobile phones should be considered insecure. Organizations should set up protocols if someone fails to check in and can’t be reached.  It is important to know that the location of a HRD using a mobile phone can be pinpointed if the GPS function is turned on, but even if it is off a person’s location can be found less accurately using cell tower triangulation. Taking the battery out of one’s phone is usually the only way to prevent tracking in this manner

What do the rest of use need to do to protect defenders? What can funders of human rights work do?

With security “we’re all in this together, like a lifeboat,;” one person’s action or inaction affects others in terms of security. Every HRD leaves digital footprints that have the possibility to expose other HRDs. “Security is a set of values to be engendered and shared, not a pizza to be delivered.” Organizations can “be proactive in supporting a security-positive culture, with lots of training and ongoing dialog.” Funders can stay anonymous when necessary; encourage grantees to write security costs into all grant proposals and then fund them. 

Organizations can designate a person/s to be responsible for monitoring new technologies and new security protocols and for updating passwords, and codes, as well as stressing vigilance. Secondly, international human rights orgs can develop relationships with trusted local advisers and meet regularly with them for their assessment of security risks.

Security tools and systems need to be more accessible and usable for human rights orgs. and defenders. Funders should provide additional resources for tech support. It is a challenge finding trustworthy IT support in foreign countries. Sometimes older, and simpler technologies such as a pad of paper and a pen as opposed to a laptop in the field are more secure.

Provide political accompaniment to increase safety. International or national NGOs can accompany local HRDs by acting as a witness and by providing public recognition of a HRDs work. This can involve having a physical presence or writing letters to American politicians or politicians in the host country. The political cost of harming local HRDs then increases if other people are watching and their profile is raised.

Participants noted a number of protection measures to pre-empt the imminent threats to HRDs or respond to threats after the fact. The list included such measures as: temporary relocation, trial observation, emergency grants and relief programs, emergency hotlines, safe houses, protective presence at HRDs offices or homes by internationals or influential nationals, and utilizing organizations that focus specifically on the protection of human rights defenders.

Training staff how to think critically about security rather than only specific tasks using a technology is important. If a HRD considers themselves not well versed in technology this methods helps them realize they know more than they think when it comes to common sense security approaches. They also realize security is an on-going process.

Resources:

Articles, Manuals, Reports

Resources for Securing Technology

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New Tactics's picture

What is security for human rights defenders?

  • What is security? What is a human rights defender? What is security for human rights defenders?
  • Why does security matter?
  • Who all are affected by the security issues of defenders? Family, colleagues, neighbors, etc?How does location affect security for defenders – rural areas versus cities, online versus offline activism?
  • How does context affect security (conflict vs. post-conflict, organized armed violence, disaster, repressive regimes, etc)?

Please share your thoughts and ideas by replying to this 'theme-comment'

Note: This dialogue is PUBLIC. Do not share any private or sensitive information. For advice on a specific situation, please contact a participant privately.

Revolutions's picture

Who is a human rights defender?

The issue of 'who is a human rights defender' is at times hotly debated -- and it is critical to our understanding of security and the right to protection for human rights defenders. 

For example, is a human rights defender...

  • Only those who are 'at risk' (i.e., does the risk, or the location, define the defender)?
  • Someone who works for a registered organization (what does this mean for community organizers in large movements, or for underground activists who can't register their organizations because of insecurity)?
  • Someone who, by virtue of standing up for their own rights and identities, encounters backlash and resistance (indigenous people protecting their land, LGBTIQ people in repressive environments, violence survivors speaking out)? 
  • A human rights defender who is now living in exile? 

The generally accepted definition of a human rights defender is very broad and inclusive (see 'Who is a Human Rights Defender' by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/who.htm). If someone who defends human rights does not consider themselves a human rights defender, or is not seen as a defender by others, they can't access the same mechanisms for protection that 'recognized' defenders can -- so this is an important issue for discussion. I'd love to hear thoughts from others! Jane Barry

edna.aquino's picture

Who is a human rights defender?


Thanks to Jane for raising these very important questions worthy of our consideration as we collectively reflect on the questions of  security and human rights defenders. 

From my perspective, it’s important to recognize the interchangeability of 'human rights defender' and ‘human rights activist' and to honor how individuals and groups working for human rights  would prefer to identify themselves.  At the same time, it’s important to recognize the existence of a very specific context by which the term ‘human rights defender’ was conceived , has evolved and has now entered the  lexicon of the international human rights system and ours, as  a global human rights movement. This context is embodied in the  UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28symbol%29/a.res.53.144.en and being elaborated and brought to life over time through the work of the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights Defenders. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/index.htm.  

Addressing the security issues of human rights defenders that require the use of human rights standards and mechanisms covered by the principles of this Declaration will need to recognize the minimum standards in determining who is a human rights defender ?  as cited in the same document mentioned by Jane and these are:   

1. Acceptance of the universality of human rights

Human rights defenders must accept the universality of human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [3] A person cannot deny some human rights and yet claim to be a human rights defender because he or she is an advocate for others. For example, it would not be acceptable to defend the human rights of men but to deny that women have equal rights.

2.  Human rights defenders must be defined and accepted according to the rights they are defending and according to their own right to do so.  Whether or not they are legally correct is not relevant in determining whether they are genuine human rights defenders. The key issue is whether or not their concerns fall within the scope of human rights.

3.  Peaceful action i. e  actions taken by human rights defenders must be peaceful in order to comply with the Declaration on human rights defenders.    

 

Edna O. Aquino

"Violence is not our culture"/ Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women

 

Marie Caraj's picture

Who is a hrd?

Thank you Jane and Edna for opening this question. My perceptions below might be implicit in your comments.
For some (A), there is no definition of hrd but a definition of the activities and for others (B), a definition of hrd activities is not a 'non definition of hrd'.
A) will avoid legiferation on hrd protection arguing that:
to pass a law on something one needs to know what it is.
B)would probably not bother about that just as Brazil has done by adopting a decree on hrd that basically copies and pastes the UN definition (activities that define a hrd): Decreto Nº 6.044, de 12 de febrero de 2007 (it's a link).
In both cases it is a question of political will.
If a (C)exist, it could be somewhere where human rights are not seen as accessories.
Any way, if the UN declaration is implemented litterally then a hrd is a hrd the length of an activity.
What about other simultaneous activities? or before or after that one? and coherence? Plus the many other perspectives of which some have been mentioned by you both: hrd who are not aware of it and a partial hrd is not a hrd.
(I'd add: some victims also can be unaware of being victims).
The difficulty is to talk about all hypothesis if the criteria of the UN Declaration on hrd are not enough to draw conclusions about such and such cases. (I refer to the declaration as it is 'universal').
One way out could be to take one example.

Somehow the UN declaration makes it accessible to a wider range of people to be/become/cease to be hrd. It speaks of rights/duties/actions etc. and attitude to carry them out (without violence which for me is slightly different than peaceful, but it might be a question of language) and less of 'status/identity'.
At the end of the day it sounds close to the concept of 'who we are matters less than what we do with who we are'...the actions define the hrd.

From the protection point of view, the Un declaration defines well who does what (who is who): primary, duty-bearer and key stakeholders.
From the security/protection point of view, it's fundamental.

I mostly meet hrd who know they are hrd (some simply because they have a sense of who they are or they have become aware because they are part of hrd networks etc) and are part of the wider civil society with its many shades.
They are not necessarily aware of the existence of texts and mechanisms (this is another item of this dialogue more related to advocacy/protection)

Marie

Ali Palh's picture

Who is Human Rights Defender?

Thanks Jane, Edna and Marie for opening this topic. This is always asked by participants during trainings, workshops, discussions and in field. From my perspective: HRD is an individual who promotes and protects human rights.

  • Neither preaches nor supports violence
  • Expose corruption of state actors
  • Reports and documents human rights violations
  • Doesn’t have personal and political agenda
  • Reports and document human rights violations
  • Support government in protection of victims and their families and raise voice for remedies for them
  • Does constructive criticism on government policies, plan and legislation
  • Respects GOOD laws and oppose bad laws
  • No particular academic qualification or degree is required for being HRD. Any individual who is lawyer, doctor, teacher, bisnessman and journalist who promote and protects human rights can be hrd  
  • Support government in making pro human rights policies, strategies and plans.

Ali Palh

Todd_Lester's picture

When HRDs are artists / community organizers using creativity

Hi Jane .. thanks for bringing up the issue of folks who do not consider themselves (self-identify) as human rights defenders.  My name is Todd Lester and I manage freeDimensional. Over the past five years of working with residential art spaces to use their surplus bedrooms to accommodate human rights defenders in distress (and on the run), we have encountered many people using creativity to fight injustice.  These folks are sometimes artists and sometimes community organizers ... typically they wear many hats and it is hard to fit them into one vocational category.  What we have observed is that the use of creativity (what some would deem an innate faculty) to fight injustice can often happen without the support of human rights organizations and social movement actors and typically happens in one of two ways: (i) the individual has had enough of a condition affecting her/his community and deploys a poem, piece of theatre, painting, installation, song, etc to comment on or critique the situation, or (ii) one of these forms of art/creativity is already available (due to a slower build-up of the condition), and her/his fellow community members appropriate the work as a tool (e.g. line in poem as rallying cry) to fight injustice.  Both of these scenarios can result in danger for the individual artist or creative type.  The danger can be just as severe as that experienced by other HRDs, but is often experienced in isolation.  Some of our work has been to help the individual (in these situations) to quickly contextualize their distress in human rights language to apply for available distress funds and services.  We also want to develop new ways to support people using creativity to fight injustice as well as HRDs in general: 

freeDimensional advances social justice by hosting activists in art spaces and using cultural resources to strengthen their work.  freeDimensional is a network of art spaces in over 70 countries that provide safe haven for oppressed  activists and culture workers in their residency apartments.  The Creative Resistance Fund (CRF) goes one step further by providing small distress grants to people in danger due to their use of creativity to fight injustice.  The fund may be used to evacuate a dangerous situation or to cover living costs while weighing long term options for safety.  To learn more or nominate someone for these services, click here.

Michele Braley's picture

increasing our network of HRDs increases our security

Hi Todd,

Thanks for sharing this inspiring and creative work!  Learning about each others' work and growing our global community of HRDs through this dialogue is an important element in increasing our security. I am grateful to add each of you and your organizations to my list of allies and resources!

Michele Braley

United States

swillcox's picture

resources for "non traditional" defenders

 Todd,

Thanks for your post.  We closely follow your work and the incredible networks you have built.  I wanted to add a comment to your discussion about defenders who wouldn't fall into the traditional sense of the word.  And Michele, perhaps this falls in line with the allies and resources you are gathering for your work.

We (Scholar Rescue Fund) work with senior academics (professors, public intellectuals, writers, scientists, and sometimes artists) who, by the nature of their academic work are threatened by state and non-state actors seeking to silence dissent. Scarily, it is not field specific.  Whether their work is in in the humanities, the sciences, or law, academics around the world are brought into the human rights discourse --  either by direct action or by circumstance -- and ultimately into the defense of human rights. The practice of their trade in free thinking and new ideas -- assuming a natural right to academic freedom -- puts them in harms way.  Like other human rights defenders, many have paid dearly.  They are an easy target:  silence one professor and you silence their classrooms, their universities, their communities.  And the silence is deafening. In less than eight years, our small program alone has received applications from over 4,000 people in the over 100 countries. (450 have received direct support.) Our work aims to protect the most severely threatened academics because their safety -- secured temporarily at host universities around the world -- goes beyond immediate protection and allows them to produce the work that would otherwise fall victim to repression.   Furthermore, bringing them to safety, if only for six months or a year, provides environments in which to recover from past trauma and contribute to their fields from afar. In this way, in defense of academic freedom, in defense of the freedom of thought and academic practice, these scholars are in their own way circumnavigating the security challenges and beating the system, so to speak.  Many have completed works that have made it back to their home communities, thereby feeding free thinking back to those who have suffered the loss of its departure.  Some have written human rights manuals, others have led advocacy campaigns for compatriots suffering at home, and with few exceptions, most take their own safety as a responsibility, and continue to expose the human rights abuses in their home communities.  All could no doubt benefit from the vast range of tools and resources posted here. I am eager to share this with them.

Sarah

Ali Palh's picture

Art and Artist have more force to fight against regimes

Thanks Todd and Sarah, for sharing such useful resources. ………………

I believe that Art and artist have more FORCE to fight for the rights of people and WILL to resist to repressive regime. An artist also has more power to mobilize large  number of people in less time..….People trust artists more than anyone else?……… At the same time art and artist face more and serious threats....... In majority of cases repressive regimes try to eliminate artists because they know it is almost difficult for them to silence an artist…. This shows artists protection needs are higher ………..  Glad to know about Scholar Rescue Fund it includes support for broader group of hrds

Ali Palh

jackie's picture

Who is a HRD? A feminist perspective from Mesoamerica

Revolutions wrote:

The generally accepted definition of a human rights defender is very broad and inclusive (see 'Who is a Human Rights Defender' by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/who.htm). 

This definition and others were hotly debated during a recent meeting of 60 women human rights defenders (WHRDs) from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama that took place in Oaxaca, Mexico April 23-25, 2010.  (Click here for more info about this gathering and here to read the final declaration approved by consensus by the WHRDs present.)  Based on conversations during the Oaxaca gathering, and on interviews of dozens of WHRDs in Mesoamerica, the organizations that convened the Oaxaca meeting put forward a definition of WHRDs that included the following statement:

“Drawing from our experience, these are the characteristics of a WHRD:

This definition cannot limit itself by closing itself off to the enormous diversity in the identity and the struggles of WHRDs. Nevertheless, we believe that the following characteristics must be taken into account by every WHRD:

  1. Consciousness of the oppressions that we are subject to as women...;
  2. An ongoing commitment to advancing women’s struggles...;
  3. Fighting for the transformation of society in all spheres, from the personal to the public to the political, and including civil society...;
  4. Consciousness that we are living at risk due to our work...;
  5. Defending human rights is not a profession...; and
  6. We do not all identify as feminists....

#s 3, 4 and 5 are easily transferable to a discussion about all HRDs. Personally, I am particularly interested in knowing how other practitioners respond to #5, as it generated some dissonance with my own definition of an HRD.  The report elaborated on this idea as follows:

“Defending human rights is not a profession. It is not an office job carried out from 9AM to 5PM.  The defense of human rights is fed/nourished by problems from everywhere, from the street, from the neighborhoods, from everyday work and from contact with other people.”

What are your thoughts on the definition that emerged from the meeting of Mesoamerican WHRDs?

Jacqueline Nolley Echegaray

Mesoamerica Program Coordinator

Just Associates (JASS)

nilsdybvig's picture

Does Human Rights work require giving up some security?

jackie wrote:

“Drawing from our experience, these are the characteristics of a WHRD:

This definition cannot limit itself by closing itself off to the enormous diversity in the identity and the struggles of WHRDs. Nevertheless, we believe that the following characteristics must be taken into account by every WHRD:

  1. Consciousness of the oppressions that we are subject to as women...;
  2. An ongoing commitment to advancing women’s struggles...;
  3. Fighting for the transformation of society in all spheres, from the personal to the public to the political, and including civil society...;
  4. Consciousness that we are living at risk due to our work...;
  5. Defending human rights is not a profession...; and
  6. We do not all identify as feminists....

#s 3, 4 and 5 are easily transferable to a discussion about all HRDs.

I really like this definition for a WHRD, and by extension the application of #s 3, 4, and 5 to all Human Rights Defenders. I hadn’t thought of it before reading these definitions, but characteristic #4 seems particularly relevant to this discussion about security. I believe that in many ways what defines us as HRDs is our willingness to take on risk.

Human Rights work assumes an environment where Human Rights are not respected. Anyone working to change this environment - often opposing powerful, entrenched interests - takes on some risk. We can work to minimize risk by implementing strong security practices, but risk is inherent in the work. And importantly, HRDs are willing to take on risk, to give up a little of their personal security, because they know that the end they are working for will justify the personal risk they assume.

Nils Dybvig
Christian Peacemaker Teams - Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz

Revolutions's picture

Next steps on 'Who is a Human Rights Defender'???

Greetings to all,

This dialogue has been so helpful and rich, thank you to everyone. I really appreciate the discussion on who is a human rights defender, because it has very practical implications in our work. If you are 'recognized' as a human rights defender, you have increased access to protection. You, and your work, are visible. And valued. If you are not, then you have less access, visibility and voice. 

So, in reflecting on our dialogue around this, it seems to me that we are facing two key issues.

The first, is that there are many activists, journalists, violence survivors, survivors of discrimination (LGBTIQQ people for example), artists, academics, etc. who are fighting for human rights and don’t know that they are entitled to protection -- because they may not identify as human rights defenders themselves, or because others would not recognize them as human rights defenders.

Secondly, as Marie points out, there are many human rights defenders who do recognize their work as human rights defense:

‘I mostly meet hrd who know they are hrd (some simply because they have a sense of who they are or they have become aware because they are part of hrd networks etc) and are part of the wider civil society with its many shades.’

However, even when human rights defenders know this is a title they can claim, they don’t know that this category gives them access to protection, and what forms of protection they are entitled to, as Marie elaborates:

‘They are not necessarily aware of the existence of texts and mechanisms (this is another item of this dialogue more related to advocacy/protection)’

I suggest, as a step forward from this dialogue, that we do the following to ensure a much broader and deeper protection framework for hrds:

  1. Help elaborate the principles and characteristics that define a human rights defender (see some of the points suggested below). Critically, this should be a process where human rights defenders define themselves. The UN Declaration is broad enough that we can positively say that these are people who must be included within it. This can be developed within key coalitions who would take it on, and supported by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders.
  2. Ensure that all people who defend human rights know that they are entitled to the title of human rights defender and that they there is a protection framework that is mandated to support them.
  3. Engage human rights grantmakers in this process.
  4. Tackle some of the hard issues of defenders who are excluded from the ‘human rights defenders’ world, discuss what ‘non-violence’ really means.

 I thought it might be helpful to recap some of the points raised in the dialogue for our review, specifically:

  1. Key principles and characteristics of human rights defenders
  2. That all people defending human rights must be recognized as human rights defenders
  3. Points of discussion and elaboration

a) Key Principles

Edna referred to three minimum standards identified in the Declaration as follows: 

  1. Acceptance of the universality of human rights: Human rights defenders must accept the universality of human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [3] A person cannot deny some human rights and yet claim to be a human rights defender because he or she is an advocate for others. For example, it would not be acceptable to defend the human rights of men but to deny that women have equal rights.
  2. Human rights defenders must be defined and accepted according to the rights they are defending and according to their own right to do so. Whether or not they are legally correct is not relevant in determining whether they are genuine human rights defenders. The key issue is whether or not their concerns fall within the scope of human rights.
  3. Peaceful action i. e  actions taken by human rights defenders must be peaceful in order to comply with the Declaration on human rights defenders. (Marie noted correctly that there is a difference between the concept of ‘non-violence’ and ‘peaceful action’, and this is significant on the spectrum of both who is a human rights defender, and also, what measures are appropriate to protect human rights defenders.)

Ali offered some very practical points primarily around human rights defenders’ activities (what they do) and approaches (how) -- as well as raising a core concept -- that there is no academic or professional requirement to ‘become‘ an hrd:  

  • HRD is an individual who promotes and protects human rights.
  • Neither preaches nor supports violence
  • Expose corruption of state actors
  • Reports and documents human rights violations
  • Doesn’t have personal and political agenda
  • Reports and document human rights violations
  • Support government in protection of victims and their families and raise voice for remedies for them
  • Does constructive criticism on government policies, plan and legislation
  • Respects GOOD laws and oppose bad laws
  • No particular academic qualification or degree is required for being HRD. Any individual who is lawyer, doctor, teacher, businessman and journalist who promote and protects human rights can be hrd  
  • Support government in making pro human rights policies, strategies and plans.

Jacqueline raised some key characteristics of a WHRD that emerged from the Mesoamerica meeting.

“Drawing from our experience, these are the characteristics of a WHRD: This definition cannot limit itself by closing itself off to the enormous diversity in the identity and the struggles of WHRDs. Nevertheless, we believe that the following characteristics must be taken into account by every WHRD:

  1. Consciousness of the oppressions that we are subject to as women...;
  2. An ongoing commitment to advancing women’s struggles...;
  3. Fighting for the transformation of society in all spheres, from the personal to the public to the political, and including civil society...;
  4. Consciousness that we are living at risk due to our work...;
  5. Defending human rights is not a profession...; and
  6. We do not all identify as feminists....

 b) Ensuring that all people who defend human rights are recognized as human rights defenders.

Todd and Sarah talked about human rights defenders who are not traditionally recognized as such, those who use art/creativity/expression:

Todd: These folks are sometimes artists and sometimes community organizers ... typically they wear many hats and it is hard to fit them into one vocational category. The danger can be just as severe as that experienced by other HRDs, but is often experienced in isolation.

Sarah: Academics (professors, public intellectuals, writers, scientists, and sometimes artists) who, by the nature of their academic work are threatened by state and non-state actors seeking to silence dissent. The practice of their trade in free thinking and new ideas -- assuming a natural right to academic freedom -- puts them in harms way 

Shaun and Saira also raised a critical issue in defining who is a human rights defender and understanding the complexities of security from the perspective of LGBTIQQ defenders. Shaun in particular also elaborated the issues around defenders who are facing multiple discriminations.

 c) Key Issues for discussion

Edna’s point about self-identification is extremely important -- she asks us to ‘recognize the interchangeability of 'human rights defender' and ‘human rights activist' and to honor how individuals and groups working for human rights  would prefer to identify themselves.’

Marie brought up a key point about a literal interpretation of the UN Declaration, which could cause us to limit the definition of a human rights defender to the time in which they are perceived as active in human rights defense. She asks: What about other simultaneous activities? or before or after that one? and coherence? Plus the many other perspectives of which some have been mentioned by you both: hrd who are not aware of it and a partial hrd is not a hrd.

Jacquelyn also commented on the idea that human rights is not a profession, saying: ‘Personally, I am particularly interested in knowing how other practitioners respond to #5, as it generated some dissonance with my own definition of an HRD.  The report elaborated on this idea as follows: “Defending human rights is not a profession. It is not an office job carried out from 9AM to 5PM.  The defense of human rights is fed/nourished by problems from everywhere, from the street, from the neighborhoods, from everyday work and from contact with other people.”

Saira further questioned the binary of separating and supporting different genders of defenders -- how do groups who support ‘women’ human rights defenders expand in their understanding of who is a ‘woman’ in a world where we understand that there are many different gender expressions than simply ‘male’ and ‘female’ -- there are gay male defenders, transgender defenders, intersex defenders, and many defenders who choose not to identify according to gender at all. Are we excluding them?

I have many thoughts on all of these questions, but for now, will simply include them here as a recap. My apologies if this doesn’t properly represent everyone’s views, it is just my take on them at the moment.

Revolutions's picture

Why does security matter?

Why do so many human rights defenders put the lives of others above their own?

Why is the response to thinking about security issues so often -- its not a priority, its not that bad (compared to the situation in xx country), I don't have time to worry about this, if they're going to get me, they'll get me -- no matter what I do. 

If we don't talk about the human beings behind the human rights defense -- what motivates them to protect themselves -- or to consider security important and possible, then how can we develop practical, usable tools and tactics? 

I'd love to hear experiences and thoughts about working with human rights defenders to see the value of taking care of their security and well-being.

Marie Caraj's picture

Why does security matters

Dear Jane,

Yours is a difficult question to start with! Existentialist (Irony given the fact that you are wondering why hrd put the lives of others above their own). Have you put the question to some of defenders?

In the training PI gives, assumptions of such positions are explored and what comes out often, is that the underlying assumption is that the hrd believe they can't do much about their own security/ risk can not be decreased. So, we work on that: on the fact that a risk has got variables that belong to the hrd/hrd organisations on which they can work: decrease vulnerability and increase capacity as to lower the feasibility of a threat and therefore, the risk. Why make it easier for the potential aggressor to get at a hrd?

Human psychology and motivation is fundamental in security and has to be taken into account. The related human behaviour is a determining factor.
It takes time to talk about it and the psychosocial impact of political violence. The psychology of liberation provides several entry points. Groups of mutual support can be set up among hrd to talk about their motivations, their feelings, choices, to carry out political analysis and call things by their names. It can help working through the different steps and put things into perspectives. It empowers the individual and the group. A Group of mutual support is also more than that.

There is a group of social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists commited to supporting hrd and who work also with victims/survivors of natural/war disaters. it is called Grupo de Apoyo Comunitario-GAC- (can easily be found on internet and some of their collaborators speak English) GAC has dedicated contact people and organisations in many countries in the world. GAC doesn't necessarily carry out its work from the perspective proper of security and hrd, yet the security of hrd has got several entry points: the risk to get to speak about the psychological and motivation dimension or the latter to get to speak about security. And many other entry points.

The above is a general opinion to your more specific questions...sorry.

Marie

Michele Braley's picture

effectiveness of hrd means paying attention to security

Greetings,

For me, its not possible to separate the defense of human rights and vigilance about safety/security of the human rights defender.  A silenced human rights defender (whether its through death, kidnapping, loss of visa, etc.) can no longer defend human rights.  In my work with Christian Peacemaker Teams (accompanying communities/organizations at risk of violence due to the armed conflict) we were very diligant about our personal safety because our ability to bring attention to the threats our Colombian partners were receiving, depended on staying safe ourselves. That does not mean the work does not require risks and acceptance of the possibility of death or kidnapping, but we did not see time spent on strategizing to minimize those risks as a waste of time.  I look forward to our mutual learning about how to increase our security in the discussion thread on that topic!

Michele Braley

 

Michele Braley

United States

Revolutions's picture

Why does security matter?

Dear Marie, 

Thanks so much for your thoughts on this. We have indeed spoken with hundreds of human rights defenders around the world about this question, and it is an integral and essential (rather than existential) part of the integrated security workshops that we've been running over the past years. Some of these conversations are reflected in What's the Point of Revolution if we Can't Dance? , Insiste, Persiste, Resiste, Existe: Women Human Rights Defenders Security Strategies and Integrated Security -- The Manual (forthcoming 2010).

The key to thinking about security/safety and well-being is first recognizing that we are as valuable as human beings as the human rights work -- and as the people we are fighting for. So that at its core, we see our security/safety/well-being as vital (and this equally and intrinsically applies to our IT/communications security). The simple message is that it is worth the 'effort' to be safe and well.

The second message -- and this was raised in our earlier conversation -- is that it is also possible to be safe and well. That every human rights defender is already doing so many things naturally to protect others (and themselves) -- many of the best strategies are within us, but just aren't recognized as strategies yet.

In our workshops, we spend a lot of time sharing those strategies among human rights defenders -- giving them space to share with, and learn from, each other. 

So I completely agree with your point that: 

the security of hrd has got several entry points: the risk to get to speak about the psychological and motivation dimension or the latter to get to speak about security. And many other entry points.

The simplest tactics for training on security/safety/well-being involve:

  • Finding the right entry points (as you mention) -- because the important thing is that we begin the conversations -- and weaving security/safety/well-being into all of our work
  • Giving human rights defenders the safe space, and time, that they need to discuss their concerns about their work and their lives (removing the idea that some things are 'private' and 'public', therefore we should only speak about 'public' threats/challenges)
  • Supporting human rights defenders to share strategies among themselves and hear strategies from others around the world
  • And then introducing specific tools that they can use and adapt -- not strict protocols, policies or plans, but ideas that help them create their own flexible prevention and response strategies
Thanks so much for the reference to GAC, their site http://www.psicosocial.net/ looks great, and I hope that others look at it as well! 
I also highly recommend: Self Care and Self Defense for Feminist Activists, it is a wonderful combination of safety and well-being, very useful exercises and in-depth thinking. 
Jane
swillcox's picture

Safety vs Security (semantics)

In our work, we often are asked for a distinction between "safety" and "security."  Are they not one in the same?  As the language is developed for human rights defenders (and the relevant standards commited to either safety or security of defenders) why is it that some choose exclusively "security" while others are compelled to use what seems a semantic discussion using the two terms.


 Does this distinction matter in the tactics/tools and even higher level discussions on the minimum standards of safety or security for defenders?  Some interpretations include:


safe - unlikely to cause physical harm; secure - invulnerable to external attack

Marie Caraj's picture

Safety vs Security (semantics)

Dear Sarah,

Personnally, I think it does although it might appear as superfluous given that, often, in the common language, the same acception is attributed to both of them.

Words mean and evoke things, ideas.

The interpretation you mention is interesting. I personnally associate safe with status and secure with action: security providing (more probability of) safety (result).

Thanks for your question as in fact I had just decided to skip talking about safety vs security on the assumption that we were talking of security although using the word safety. Thanks.

Marie

edna.aquino's picture

Safety vs Security (semantics)

Hi Sarah:

I think it's more than just semantics.  I think the terminology 'security' has increasingly become part of our everyday language especially since after 11/09.  In the Philippines - we tend to associate  'security' with the State counter-insurgency policy that extends to curtailment or restrictions of basic rights and freedoms of activists.  We use 'safety' when referring to securing, protecting, ourselves as activists and those close to us; and also pre-empting the foreseeable dangers that are likely to come and underscoring that all these are temporary measures.   There are reservations, too,  amongst some activists - not only in the Philippines - with the word 'security' - also because of their view that they can never be secure in a very insecure environment which they have no control over.   And finally - there is the question of translation.  In our language - 'safety' has a direct translation while 'security' doesn't have.  This ilustrates that indeed there are nuances  and difference around the terminologies that we use and adopt as part of our global language and those of activists on the ground due to the latter's context -specific realities. it's always important to clarify, describe what we meant, negotiate, adjust and finally agree on what is the most appropriate terminology without losing the essence of what we meant. 

Edna O. Aquino

"Violence is not our culture"/ Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women

 

UAF Saira's picture

Safety vs Security

Greetings! 

Thank you all for raising this important question: the difference between the terms 'safety' and 'security.'  I agree with Edna that it really depends on contexts and language/translation.  There are many places (Kurdish cities in Turkey, Palestine, the Philippines, to name only a few) that are so militarised and repressive against activists that the thought to consider one's own security seems almost irrelevant.  We see this regularly in grant requests when a WHRD is facing serious threats and will request funds for an awareness raising campaign for instance, and not for immediate measures for her own security. 

My question in these cases is, when physical (not to mention emotional, financial, or otherwise) security is seemingly so unattainable that it's not even considered, would there be any distinction between the terms and/or concepts of 'security' vs. 'safety?'  Or does it again depend on language and context.  I believe that may well be the case but I'm not totally sure.  This will indeed require some further thinking on my part...

In terms of languages, contexts, and translations, the situation Edna describes in the Philippines is similar to that in some parts of the Arab world.  In Arabic for instance, the term for security is rather clear and often always associated with the state or state apparatus.  However, there are different words for safety (one is the same as the word for security) that are used more for the individual state of being.  One term for safety (salaama/salaameh), has at its root, the word for peace and also means integrity.  I will stop here because if I launch into a discussion on Arabic etymology it may never end.

Lastly, the term 'security' can also set off some red flags within the philanthropic community in the US.  Particularly post 9-11 with all of the so-called counter-'terrorism' measures that are increasingly posing obstacles to the funding world.  Our colleagues at another US fund that is much larger than ours, have strongly advised us to specifically abstain from using the word 'security' when discussing grants via email that are in our Protection and Security category because it may well be flagged by authorities.  Which authorities?  I do not know for certain but could guess.  They have requested us to use 'safety' instead.  I note that they are a much larger fund than UAF because one would think there is less scrutiny on such large funds with their teams of expert lawyers but apparently not.

Thank you all for the thought provoking posts.

Until tomorrow

Peace

Saira

swillcox's picture

language and flags

Hi Saira,

Thanks for your post.  You've really raised for me the concerns of and the abuse of language in the HR context.  We all know language can be twisted so easily for sinister effect and of course must choose our words wisely.  Not only as a responsibility but as a tactic to avoid the red flags you mention that may unnecessarily hinder the work at hand. Perhaps a list of no-go words should be included in the following ICT discussions.  Ironic to think that "security" may well be one of them!

Sarah 

Ali Palh's picture

To me: Safety means

To me: Safety means protection against something and security protection against someone..............safety is protection against  fire, electric shock etc which is result of an accident and there is no conscious effort behind it ...it happens due to a mistake or negligence….. Security is protection against someone/person's or an organization's action which deliberately try to harm defender to achieve an objective....

Ali Palh

edna.aquino's picture

Security and HRDs: the personal and the political divide

Drawing from my own experience,  I would say that our activism is very much influenced or moulded by the dominant 'values system'  of our movements or organisations which then partly defines how we respond to situations  including safety / secuity questions. In my case, for instance, I was deeply involved for  years (snce my youth days)  in social movements whose value systems view valorism and embracing of hardships and personal sacrifices as 'givens' and as important tests to prove one's commitment to the cause.  And if you're a woman in my society, there is another layer of value system that further reinforces these values that promote the sublimation of one's personal needs to the greater cause. Thinking of one's own safety or security before that of others can therefore easily become a source of guilt or mental baggage to many activists or HRDs coming from that similar milieu I just described. Jane Barry's insights drawn from her many conversations with WHRDS in various contexts regarding their well-being and security resonate this theme over and over again.    

I think it's really important to build into any security strategy a space for HRDs to examine their perceptions and attitudes in relating their personal needs for safety and well-being with their work on behalf of others. Beyond the technological resources and infratructure, we need tools and skills , too, that would facilitate the mindshift and help build a safety-/ security-positive culture that breaks down the invisible barrier between the personal and the political aspects of our lives as human rights defenders.  This would probably have a greater prospect of sustainability.    

Edna O. Aquino

"Violence is not our culture"/ Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women

 

Marie Caraj's picture

Security and HRDs: the personal and political divide

Quoting Edna : “Thinking of one's own safety or security before that of others can therefore easily become a source of guilt or mental baggage to many activists or HRDs coming from that similar milieu I just described”

Apart from the many other assumptions on which the ‘guilt feelings’ might be based on, there might be also the one of having to choose between the ‘others’ and oneself as if the security of both was not interrelated and there were no choices possible that contemplated the security of hrd as also the security of the groups they are working with. An increased security of hrd means also an increased seurity of the groups. If a hrd is hit individuals and group are hit too and viceversa.

Marie

Kyrgyzstan's picture

Situation of HRD in post-conflict southern region of Kyrgyzstan

The issue of secutiry for human rights defenders became sharp after the April events in Kyrgyzstan. The Provisional Government couldn't prevent the ethnic conflict in the South of Kyrgyzstan. Civil society and human rights defenders did their best to help people and protect the 'core' of human rights listed in art. 6 of ICCPR. However, due their active role in Osh and Djalalabad cities Human rights defenders are threatened.
This cases below show how a HRD trying to defend HR becomes himself/helself a subject of violations and is threatened. For example, Ms. Tolekan Ismailova, the director of Human Rights Center 'Citizens against Corruption' had to leave country for a while, because she was threatened for defending victims of violence. Another HRD Azimdjan Askarov was detained and without fair trial has been kept in prison. Moreover, he has been subjected to torture. Acting Prosecutor General commented on it as if 'Azimdjan quarreled with his cellmate and was hit on head, fell down and got injuries.'
It hard to establish any mechanism of security for HRD, as in Kyrgyzstan Rule of Law does not exist. The country joined UHRD 1948, ICCPR 1966, and other UN Decleration, however in most cases these international obligations are not fullfilled, and there is not effective mechanisms to 'push' Kyrgyzstan to implment these obligations. WHICH MECHANISM COULD BE USED AND BE EFFECTIVE TO ENSURE SAFETY OF HRD IN THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THEM?

Marie Caraj's picture

Situation of HRD in post-conflict southern region of Kyrgyzstan

Dear Kyrgystan,

Your question " WHICH MECHANISM COULD BE USED AND BE EFFECTIVE TO ENSURE SAFETY OF HRD IN THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THEM?" is not easy to explore as it would require a thorough field forces, actors mapping and risk analysis to start with. Also the current level of security implemented by hrd in Kyrgyzstan. So the risk is to repeat banalities and anyway, be general given the public nature of the dialogue.

Unfortunately, in security, there is no guarantee of result or result guaranteed. Field forces and actors mapping analysis should also help find out many factors and among them, also 'interest relations between actors' that can be used in the security strategy building. Example: if a country A depends on counries B, C,D etc for trade, then the security startegy could integrate advocacy with B, C, D embassies and pressure from organisations of countries B, C, D on their governments and parliaments aiming at country A authorities to change behaviour as the political cost of an aggression increases and margin of impunity decreases. This is based also on the assumption that amidst countries B,C,D etc, there some who are committed to the cause of hrd.

The risk analysis can help the hrd in reducing their exposure to risk. The risk is never equal to zero. Of course, theory is easier than practice.  And general theory even easier than specific practice. The context is very complex especially if there is absence of Rule of Law and, consequent, lack of State structures to receive hrd complaints and follow up on them positively.

Have you had a look at the publications on PI's website for hrd? www.protectionine.org  You can of course find our publications:

Risk analysis: NPMHRD suggests a checklist of information needed to assess vulnerabilities and capacities. And there is more information in the NPMHRD. Allen reminded (talking about IT security in his contribution 'Like a lifeboat'):

gunner wrote:

TOR browsing takes longer than insecure browing, security tools take time to learn and install, security culture is a chronometrically consuming discipline just like a garden is. Both take time to blossom and sustain.

There is an analogy with developing security strategy, security plan and management. Post-conflict is ambiguous as it often means that there is no 'war' as such but it doesn't reflect the lack of justice that is variable of a conflict context. I feel uncomfortable with my answer as the description you sent is serious. Yet I wanted to chip.

Marie

Revolutions's picture

Mechanisms

Dear Kyrgystan,

First of all, thank you so much for sharing the situation of human rights defenders in Kyrgystan -- I am so sorry that the situation has changed so rapidly in your beautiful country, and that for you all, as human rights defenders, standing up for the rights of all the citizens of your country, and for peace, has become so urgent, and so risky.

Without getting into specific cases, as that would pose challenges if we were to discuss it on an open forum such as this, I would like us as a group to discuss some particular mechanisms that relate to both Kyrgystan, and to other countries where these issues are so similar.

1. Deploying the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders

First of all, I had heard that some groups in Kyrgystan have already done some work with European Embassies in helping them understand the importance and use of the EU Guidelines -- they are a very practical tool in this instance for advocating to the European Embassies (and even to the non-European Embassies) to both provide protection to human rights defenders -- and to speak out to the government on the behalf of human rights defenders and their work. I believe that the guidelines have been mentioned a bit on this discussion so far, but I would love to hear more about their practical use here!

2. Connecting to Regional and International Coalitions

I believe there is a regional (CIS) coalition for human rights defenders? Perhaps this is a useful information and advocacy network to get your message out, and to think about concrete ways to have these discussions with the new government. Secondly, there are other networks that might be equally useful on the international level, I can think of the Women Human Rights Defenders International Coalition (http://www.defendingwomen-defendingrights.org/) as just one example (Edna, any thoughts?). 

3. Collaboration with International organizations that provide advocacy and grants around security of human rights defenders

I am sure you know many of these organizations -- like Front Line, Amnesty International, Urgent Action Fund for Women's Human Rights, etc. -- but it may be worth pulling together a list of your allies such as these and keeping them up to date on your situation -- and asking for support in pushing the government to respect the work of human rights defenders.

Also, in instances related to torture, it is worth being in touch with the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) -- http://www.omct.org/ -- they are very experienced and helpful in these cases.

4. Ensure that security/safety/well-being is included in all your project budgets

As one of our colleagues (Rick?) has already mentioned -- it is vital that we tell our donors the situation (communicating this through secure channels), and integrate into our budget requests funds for ensuring the protection of individual human rights defenders and your organizations. This includes physical protection (safe transport, communications, mobile phones, security cameras, protection for your homes, etc, as well as funds to cover health care costs and support for your families, among others). It also includes funds to ensure you have the time and space to safely strategize together. These aren't 'nice to have', they are 'must haves' -- you all need to be able to respond quickly and flexibly if a colleague is arrested or needs to temporarily relocate or falls ill or has an accident. If your donors question these costs, then have the discussion with them -- and you can remind them that there is a movement among many human rights donors to ask these very questions and to include them in the budgets they offer!

I hope these are some useful and practical thoughts, and that others will come in with more for you. 

Spasibo bolshoye za Vashu vazhniyu rabotu. S glubokim uvazheniyem vsyem, Jane

swillcox's picture

Kyrgyzstan

Thank you all for your comments on Kyrgyzstan.  We've been helping a scholar there who has committed his academic life to human rights law and working across ethnic divides.  As an ethnic Uzbek, he can no longer go safely to his university and is barricaded in his home with his family, leaving only for the sparse basic necessities now available in his city.  Our program is offering assistance to get him to a university outside of his country for a year, in hopes things calm enough for his return.  In the meantime, he is stifled and his voice is not being heard.  He says he would take more security risks, but he has family to provide for and to worry about.  This brings home the difficult choices human rights defenders have to make in bringing their work home or bringing their home to work. 

Meanwhile, we (www.scholarrescuefund.org) are monitoring the situation as closely as possible from afar.   Jane, thank you for your list of organizations to connect to. The International Crisis Group, HRW and Amnesty have had their usual good coverage and continue to impress upon the international community that the next flare up may be imminent, and may be much worse.  It seems that international intervention is absolutely necessary.  Until then, how much longer can people remain prisoners in their own homes?

Sarah

kantin's picture

Pointers for HRDs for engaging the EU and Norway (by Front Line)

Connecting human rights defenders to embassies in their countries has been brought up a few times in this dialogue (such as the quote below from Jane) and it piqued my interest.

Revolutions wrote:

1. Deploying the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders

First of all, I had heard that some groups in Kyrgystan have already done some work with European Embassies in helping them understand the importance and use of the EU Guidelines -- they are a very practical tool in this instance for advocating to the European Embassies (and even to the non-European Embassies) to both provide protection to human rights defenders -- and to speak out to the government on the behalf of human rights defenders and their work. I believe that the guidelines have been mentioned a bit on this discussion so far, but I would love to hear more about their practical use here!

I read the Front Line Handbook titled 'What Protection Can EU and Norwegian Diplomatic Missions Offer?' and found it very helpful with great suggestions on all the different ways that defenders can strengthen their relationships with this diplomatic missions.  Here is the checklist of 'overall pointers' that the Handbook offers at the end of the document:

  • Provide complete, credible, detailed, and up-to-date information about your case. Diplomats will only want to take action on your case if they feel they have adequate information.
  • Be professional and impartial in your work. Diplomats will more easily take action, especially if it is public action, on behalf of a HRD who enjoys a reputation of integrity and whose work is respected.
  • Make yourself and your work known to the diplomatic community. While their policies require that diplomats be proactive in contacting HRDs, they will not always be so.
  • Have contact information of the staff of diplomatic missions (mobile phone numbers, etc.) with you at all times; provide your contact information to diplomats.
  • Collaborate with international human rights organisations in relation to your work and your own situation. Diplomats are more likely to take action in relation to issues and cases that the international human rights organisations bring to their attention. Give a personal reference of an international organisation you work with.
  • Engage ambassadors and foreign ministries. Make efforts to ensure that decisions on whether to take action in relation to your case are not left only to less senior staff at embassies. However, be wise in your approach – write a letter giving a clear and accurate account of your situation and ask for a meeting. Then follow up with a phone call.
  • Know the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and refer to it when reporting on your situation or the situation of local HRDs.
  • Understand the structures and processes (such as political dialogue) of the EU and Norway so that you know how and when you should lobby for attention for your situation or the situation of local HRDs.

Now, I am curious to know more about how defenders can utilize the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders - any Handbooks on this out there?

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

Marie Caraj's picture

Mechanisms

Many of the participants have already made references to Protection mechanisms and I would like to just mention that in the Library of PI, www.protectionline.org, under PI publications, there is the following manual that I hope can add to the tools at hrds’ disposal:

Protection of human rights defenders: Best practices and lessons learnt
Volume I: legislation, national policies and defenders’ units.

Where legislation and national policies have been developped for the hrd defenders (mostly in some countries of Latin and Central America), the rate of violations against hrd has not necessarily decreased.
The manual also illustrates some non governmental initiatives by hrds' units. Hrds'units are set up by the civil societies. Their sole mission is the protection of hrds. For example, in Guatemala: Udefegua; in Colombia: Somos defensores; in Uganda: EHAHRDP.

swillcox's picture

Manuals and Guides

Thank you so much, Kristin and Marie Caraj. Invaluable reading and resources for us to read and to share with our partners.

Louis Frankenthaler's picture

Protecting HRDs beyond physical violence

Protectin HRDs is an issue in many placese, even where we are not in danger of physical violence or arrest.  In Israel there is a campaign in place against the human rights community that includes, among other things, attacks on HR and HR NGOs by extreme right wing organizations and the adoption of this deligitimizing and demonizing stance by the Government and the Legislature, as is happening in Israel.  It is possible to look at the annex to PCATI's briefing the the UN Human Rights Committee to learn more about this at

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/PCATI_Israel99.pdf

Also, human rights defenders, such as those who demonstrate agains the Occupation/settlements and expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem often face direct physical violence by the Israeli security forces.  Similalry when arrested they face bannishment by the Court from the sites of the demonstrations.  Also the security forces often try to close the demonstration areas, such as those in Bilin and Sheikh Jarrah, to demonstrators on a very selective basis that is clearly biased against HRDs

Louis Frankenthaler Development & International Outreach Director Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) "The most powerful weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed." (Steve Biko)

kantin's picture

Resiste: WHRDs Security Strategies & Integrated Security

Thank you, Louis, for challenging the assumption that protecting human rights defenders means that there is physical violence or arrest on the line.  Indeed, slander, smear campaigns, stigmatisation, etc are all serious threats to defenders.  I have been thinking about your comment as I paged through Jane Barry's book Insiste, Persiste, Resiste, Existe: Women Human Rights Defenders Security Strategies and Integrated Security

Jane starts the book by focusing on the threats that human rights defenders face - women, in particular. She analyzes why women defenders are persecuted, what the tactics have been to persecute these defenders, the baseline of these threats, how defenders are intimidated, and who is behind these threats.  Next, she explores strategies that women defenders have used to face these threats.  Here are a few examples (quotes from the text):

  • On the most fundamental level, WHRDs use the courage of their convictions to protect themselves. 
  • Choosing your battles: WHRDs make strategic choices about when and how to take a stand.
  • Taking action against slander - legal action, ignoring it, finding the moment when your opponent's threat backfires
  • Strategic spirituality and symbolic resistance
  • For many WHRDs, their families are their first line of protection
  • Because isolation is one of the most serious threats to the security of WHRDs, solidarity is one of the most effective protection strategies in the world.
  • Building strong networks is part of an inherently feminist approach to collective action.
  • Staying under the radar, has its pros and cons, but it often works to keep WHRDs alive, active and effective.
  • Assuming different identities
  • and many more!

The text is sprinkled with powerful quotes from women human rights defenders from all over the world (many of the interviews are carried out by Vahida Nainar).  It is an empowering and inspiring read - please take the time to download it, read it, and disseminate it to you colleagues, grant recipients, donors, and friends. 

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

New Tactics's picture

What impact does a defender's gender have on security?

  • How is security different for human rights defenders of different genders?
  • How is security different for human rights defenders of different identities (religion, politics, race, nationality, disability, class, etc)?

Please share your thoughts and ideas by replying to this 'theme-comment'

Note: This dialogue is PUBLIC. Do not share any private or sensitive information. For advice on a specific situation, please contact a participant privately.

shaun.kirven's picture

Identity and Security

Protection of LGBT Activists:

I personally think that when we are looking at how identity or identities can affect the levels of security and protection  that defenders can enjoy we have to look at structural forms of prejudice and discrimination. To develop specific protection measures or to have our rights to protection legally recognised we need to unpack not only how discrimination is entrenched in legal systems but also how  the practices of "mainstream" defenders communities can often perpetuate similar prejudices and forms of discrimination.  Simple or multiple discrimination can in effect exclude defenders from the discussions that set protection agendas. If defenders are being marginalised and excluded then discussions that centre around protection and security management will fall short of reaching the required specificity.  How do you develop security plans for defenders whose personal lives are considered illegal and possibly immoral by the prevailing legal and social system?  How do defenders exercise their rights to freedom of assembly, fundamental to any rights campaigning, if those meetings are subject to raids and the defenders to imprisonment and torture? how do you address issues of secondary victimization if crimes are reported to State authorities. I speak mainly of the LGBTI defenders community as that is my main area of interest and  I have unfortunately found that many organisations claiming to work on protection of LGBT activists approach the issues from a very hetero-normative perspective that can in effect distance activists from the messages the organisations are trying to deliver.

There are many countries where same-sex activity is still illegal which not only prevents people from openly forming organisations to defend human rights but actually prevents the development of communal protection measures due to fears of outing through association. When there is no recourse to the law for protection because who you are is illegal often defenders will resort to family and friends for protection and security. There are extremes where family members have outed their relatives and those defenders have had to leave their home countries. Friends can become very "fair weathered" when facing similar charges and the possibility of arrest. The work is driven underground making the "one size fits all method" of publicizing threats and talking to officialdom and diplomatic representations pretty much redundant.

Trans activists can often be arrested simply because their id documents don't match their physical appearance and often face considerable hostility when traveling to national and international conferences because the laws in their country do not recognise the right not to be discriminated against because of their gender identity or expression. Many of the trans activists I personally know are also sex workers and I have often seen their profession colour responses to their protection from the the threats they receive because of their activism. The recent case in honduras where two trans activists that denounced abuses by the police and were then subjected to violent attacks and harassment is but one example where embassies were very slow to respond despite pressure from national and international organisations.

National LGBT organisations do exist despite the tremendous obstacles many of them face. Obstacles that range from a  lack of funding to having rights to privacy violated because of who you are perceived to be.  The marginalisation that many LGBT organisations and activists experience is one of the greatest challenges to developing effective security  and protection measures. Lack of funding for LGBT human rights work exacerbates the competitiveness between organisations which effects the capacity to build  the strong networks necessary for any form of protection. International organisations that have taken up the cause of LGBT defenders are often at best misguided in their approaches to the work. The recent case of the two people in Malawi is one such example of how the international community got it wrong.  In the rush to champion the "gay" issue and the rights to non-discrimination many internationals categorised both people as men when one of them clearly self-identified as a woman. Her identification and understanding of her rights to self-expression and development of one's own personhood is what was being attacked. Linked with anti-african sentiments, she was accused of being un-african and under the influences of the west. Blindness to the diversity of the LGBT community around the globe is yet another obstacle to the development of specific protection measures. In Malawi we were not dealing with a simple case of criminalized sexual activity the issue was/is more complex and that complexity needs to be recognised, unpacked and worked with if we are to effectively ensure protection.  

The local organisation in Malawi whilst this case was drawing the attention of the both local and international press was also undergoing investigation having been charged with violating the local public decency ann morality laws. Charged with having pornographic material in the office and with its members facing court cases and possible prison sentences  they were in no position to deal with the "other" Malawian case. The case was then taken up by internationals that had little contact with either of the two and the subsequent mistakes were made. International pressure got them released but under the threat of re-arrest should they commit similar "crimes" in the future,  There is a need now for relocation yet the international community that supported them in prison has moved on to the next sensational case and one of the activists is still at risk. As they were being charged another organisation in Zimbabwe was also being investigated under similar laws and two of its members arrested for possession of pornographic material. One of them has now been released, being a woman she would have no interest in "gay" porn I think was the Judge's verdict, the other, her male colleague still awaits trial.  South African organisations have complained of similar tactics being used against them and their offices being raided. Further north in Uganda people have been outed in media campaigns fueled by the religious right as homosexuals, and assumed pedophiles. In Kenya known trans activists have been picked up on the street, the police having assumed they were soliciting "why else would a man be in woman's clothing", arrested and then tortured until bribes were paid to gain their release.  From my experience in Asia and Latin America the picture is very similar. 

I raise these cases as I think this is one of the greatest challenges to ensuring protection, how do we counter act the prevailing public morality argument that is not only designed to spread fear in every household throughout the land, thanks to the media, but also distances Diplomatic Missions and other international multilateral bodies from becoming involved because of the morality issue? 

Going back to multiple forms of discrimination and exclusion. Women within the LGBT community are often silenced and mis-represented by their male peers. Lesbian leadership is the exception not the rule presenting challenges if we are to develop the specificity needed to protect them. Unfortunately the feminist movement in many countries has also shied away from taking up the issues of lesbian activists. A seemingly obvious ally that in reality tends to reflect  wider societal norms and values rather than celebrating the diversity of the women's movement. Socio-cultural norms often translated into quasi legal structures prevent women from organising and collectively campaigning for their rights. Their almost subjugation and invisibility within the LGBT movement makes it all but impossible to get discussions on protection and security on the table unless specific programmes are developed for them and the space created for them to organise and attend. Getting women out of the home is one of the primary challenges we face in developing protection measures. Combine that with a lack of funding and hetero-normative approaches to security and protection and we still have long way to go in accessing this sector of the human rights community. If the majority of women are not afforded human rights can we expect much for this minority population? How do we address discrimination within discrimination?

In short when we talk of protection of the LGBT community we need to address firstly our own approaches to the questions of security and protection and secondly to recognise the diversity of community we are working with, being prepared to challenge not only our own prejudices but also our very sense of gender. Having done this we might be ready to step up and take on the challenges that will in effect lead to real protection for LGBT activists.

For more information see PI's Protection Manual for LGBTI Defenders revised ed. 2009

Shaun Kirven

London and Elsewhere

email: shaun [dot] kirven [at] gmail [dot] com

Mb: + 44 7757639829

Skype: shaun.kirven

edna.aquino's picture

RESOURCES:WHRDS and security issues confronting them

Here is a list of 'essential ' readings regarding the WHRDS and which answer most of the questions related to their distinct security issues based on their gender.  This is not an exhaustive list but it's worth noting that the report of the UNSR on HRDS (item 1) has inspired and has effectively provided the foundation for most if not all of these outstanding body of work on women, their gender and its impact on their work as HRDs.  The proceedings of the International Consultation in 2005  (item 4) offers some very rich insights on how the specific threats to the security of WHRDS are attributable to the 'gender and identity'.  Many of these resonate Shaun Kirven's earlier posting on Identity and Security.

1.  Report of the UNSR on Human Rights Defenders to the 58th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (See Part II-B ) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G02/111/22/PDF/G0211122.pdf?OpenElement

 2. Claiming Rights, Claiming Justice: A Guidebook on Women Human Rights Defenders http://www.defendingwomen-defendingrights.org/pdf2008/EN_Claiming_Rights.pdf

3. New Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders (3rd Edition), Chapter 1.9 on Secrity for Women Human Rights Defenders http://protectionline.org/IMG/pdf/1-9_Manual_English_3rdEd.pdf

4. The International Consultation on Women Human Rights Defenders was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, between 29 November and 2 December 2005. 2005.http://www.defendingwomen-defendingrights.org/pdf/WHRD-Proceedings.pdf

 5. Urgent Action Fund (UAF) Gender Focused Rapid Response Teams:A Preliminary Discussion of the Concept and Potential for Implementation http://www.urgentactionfund.org/assets/files/uaf-pubs/RRT%20Report_Final...

 6. “Insiste, Persiste, Resiste, Existe “  Women Human Rights Defenders’ Security Strategies http://www.urgentactionfund.org/assets/files/Resiste/Resiste-Final-Web.pdf

 7. “Rising up in Response”  Women’s Rights Activism in conflict (Jane Barry and UAF) http://www.urgentactionfund.org/assets/files/RUiR/Rising-Up-In-Response.pdf

Edna O. Aquino

"Violence is not our culture"/ Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women

 

Michele Braley's picture

New publication on gender perspective from FOR

Thanks, Edna, for this list of resources.  I would add this recent publication by Fellowship of Reconcilliation: Womens Peacemaker Program:

“Engendering Peace- Incorporating a Gender Perspective in Civilian Peace Teams”. 

The lead-in to the chapter on Gender, Conflict and Peacebuilding states, "There is no conflict in recent history where women and girls have not
been targeted for sexual violence, whether as a form of torture, as a
method to humiliate the enemy, or with a view to spreading terror and
despair. If that’s not potentially relevant to the protection of international
peace and security, what is?"  – Marianne Mollmann, Human Rights Watch,
Women’s Division1

Michele Braley

United States

Ali Palh's picture

Security of women hrds, Identity and other factors

Thanks Edna for sharing list of reading regarding the security of whrds. As we know, women hrds have specific threats and protection needs. In most cases, their threats were identified from their co-workers and colleagues who were not ready to accept them at leadership positions. The one of the workable strategies was recognition to women hrds by well recognized male members of society and their statement in media in the favor of their work increases the level of security of women hrds an dreduces the threats from their collegaues.

Statement of religious leaders in favor of women at leadership position not only stop other religious leader to issue verdicts against women HRDs but help creating space and acceptance in the religious pockets of the society. Also help improve whrd’s general security situation in the area. One such tactic used by one woman hrd in Pakistan was very useful when she wrote a document saying ‘women have equal leadership qualities to men and Islam does not  bar women from taking leadership positions. She got it signed by more than 20 religious leaders of the area and got it published. It also had very good impact on her and other whrds security. WHRDs acceptance within their family and close social circle also help improving the general security of WHRD.

One powerful, well recognized and well-respected woman who is also elected representative (Member of National Assembly) in Pakistan visited a woman hrd which increased the acceptance for women hrd and her work in the area and improved her security. Not only is this, after such visit, whrds’ institution has started receiving funding offers from donors. So we can see how donors are influenced by the power.

Currently, 33% women representation in parliament and women ministers in the cabinet has a very positive impact on women and whrds’ security and recognition of their work.  

Using statements of religious, tribal and spiritual leaders’ in favor of sexual minorities create acceptance for them in the societies.

Regarding LGBT, their acceptance within their family and their close social group has also positive impact on their security in the society. Strong financial situation also plays important role in the improvement of security and acceptance of LGBT. So does education and profession.  In Pakistani society generally people think that DANCE is not allowed by Islam so if LGBT learn and do dance come under threat or face harassments. As compare to rich and educated LGBTs poor and uneducated LGBTs are more vulnerable to these threats.

Ali Palh

swillcox's picture

is visibility security?

Hi Ali,

Your point on raising the visibility of women hrds through public recognition is important.  While we discuss the importance of security measures that help to shield the identities of hrds who could be harmed for their work, we should remember that the press, advocacy campaigns and other high visibility mechanisms are yet other means to protection.  Each case is unique of course and the choice to "go public" is complicated and must be weighed with all potential repercussions. But as your examples illustrate, it can be effective and a shield in itself.

Sarah

UAF Saira's picture

What's Up with Dropping G's?

On how the issue of security is different for HRDs of different identities and genders -

There is not much I would add to Shaun Kirven's eloquent articulation regarding security issues within LGBTQI communities.  I appreciate the issue of threats to trans individuals being raised as well.  As we know, due to increased visibility of trans activists, particularly those engaged in sex work, the threats and attacks against them are higher in number and often very severe. 

I have been noticing what I find to be a bit of an alarming trend within the women's movements as of late.  What I'm referring to is the dropping of letters, specifically the G, in the oft growing acronym LGBTQQI...  I can understand the history of access argument to an extent but exclusion is not the best way to work toward social justice.  Diversity within our movements is something to celebrate and from which we should learn.  Shaun's point on this is excellent.  In terms of diversity, I think there are different, intergenerational lenses, which, when collaborative in nature, would be very helpful in the way forward on this issue. 

Threats, risks, attacks...any breach of security discriminates according to contexts and identities.  Homophobia is ubiquitious.  'Passing' in certain contexts can be very important but that's not to say lesbians and gay activists do not face a high level of threats as well.  Gay and trans men in Jamaica for example, are often the targets of violence and hate crime.  Is it acceptable, then, to limit our support to trans or women-identified human rights defenders?
 

New Tactics's picture

How does security relate to information, communication & tech?

  • In what ways do ICT tools assist in providing security for defenders?
  • In what ways do ICT tools make defenders more vulnerable to security incidents?
  • What resources and tools can defenders utilize to be more secure?

Please share your thoughts and ideas by replying to this 'theme-comment'

Note: This dialogue is PUBLIC. Do not share any private or sensitive information. For advice on a specific situation, please contact a participant privately.

gunner's picture

How does it not?

Everything we do online, everything we do with a computer, everything we do that involves transmitted data, whether analog or digital, is recordable, copyable, transferable, morphable and redistributable. And thus security considerations should be ubiquitous in all discussions relating to any of the above.

The question posed should not be "how" but "where", and the answer is "everywhere". And then some.

Protecting what we store, protecting what we send, and protecting how others perceive and consume what we produce in earnest is critical to effective social change efforts in the online and digital contexts. Understanding how to encrypt, sign, authenticate and employ other verification protocols, and then faithfully following those processes, is an utterly essential component of all trust-dependent collaborations.

This also brings up the paradox of backup. We absolutely need to back up appropriate and requisite resources and records (and delete the rest via aggressive non-retention policies) in order to assert "our side" of stories that are appropriate to preserve, but we need to store such assets in a secure, encrypted fashion, away from those who would seek to confiscate or otherwise abscond with them in order to erase that which is not in their interest. Encrypted, off-site backup: it's like a safety net for your electronic reality and for your human rights work.

Allen Gunn
Executive Director, Aspiration / www.aspirationtech.org

swillcox's picture

sharing tactics for

Hi Allan,

This is certainly an area we are most concerned with as we work "virtually" with human rights defenders around the world. Our concerns are most often related to interceptions of messages and communications. I have a question for you that most likely can't be answered as clearly as one would hope, given the nature that all (including these posts) is recorded, read and shared, and often with and by those who are not the intended recipients.

How can one securely share tools, protocols, and verification strategies when these very tools, protocols and verification techniques must be shared through often unprotected, unencrypted means? Are we relegated to face-to-face sharing/training? Or are there relatively simple techniques with basic technology that we can use to keep one step ahead of those who may be seeking to intercept our communications?

Thanks,

Sarah

gunner's picture

I believe that open source

I believe that open source philosophy and "hiding in plain sight" are the only way to go in disseminating security tools and associated knowledge. If "keeping tools secret" from the "other side" is your primary protection against compromise, that's a weak boundary to say the least.

Trying to be secretive about security tools is a distraction in my opinion. While there is no need to overshare or save your adversaries time by telegraphing unnecessary details, "They" know all about the tools in play and/or can pay others who do. Good security tools and platforms (TOR, Public Key Encryption, OTR, Linux) can stand the scrutiny and it makes them better.

That is distinct from being secretive about tactics, strategy and senstive knowledge and data; that's the stuff you want to keep off radar using the free and open security tools. Verification strategies fall into the category of things to be circumspect about.

But tools and protocols? The way you stay one step ahead is to follow best practices with proven tools and platforms, and show others how to do the same. Hide in plain sight!

 

Allen Gunn
Executive Director, Aspiration / www.aspirationtech.org

Ali Nardone's picture

Secure Communication

Hi Allen, I certainly agree that ensuring the safety and security of our records, resources, and information is essential to preserving our own safety and security. Activists need to understand how to employ these tactics, as well as employ them consistently so the risk of detention or abuse is lessened.

I would like to share a piece written by Patrick Meier of DigiActive entitled "Quick Guide to Secure Information". This article includes a very thorough list of ways to stay safe and protect your data when taking part in digital activism. He includes tactics and technologies that can be used with:

  • Mobile phones
  • Digital cameras
  • Computers/Laptops
  • Flash disks
  • E-mail
  • Browsers and Websites
  • VoIP (online telephony)
  • Blogs and Social Networking Sites
  • File Sharing
  • Cyber Cafes

The list is truly exhaustive, and I would urge anyone interested in keeping safe while participating in cyber-activism to read this piece. There are tons of links throughout the article, some of which include:

CryptoSMS, SMS 007, and Kryptext (secure texting)

Bitlocker, TrueCrypt, PGP Whole Disk Encryption, and Check Point (hard drive encryption)

Hushmail and Rise Up (encrypted email platforms)

Tor Software and Psiphon (secure browsers)

As I said, there are many more links, as well as very useful tips on how to store and access information safely, so please see the original article for more information.

Ali Nardone

New Tactics in Human Rights Project Intern

Ali Palh's picture

Seriousness towards security also add to security

Thanks Ali for sharing Patrick Meiers guide. Links are very useful. In internet communication and browsing, softwares and secure emailings improves security.  Not only this, these systems gives sense of security.

In contexts, where i have worked or working hushmail emailing and true crypt are well tested and reliable. Will definitely check others.

I always stress on seriousness and responsible attitude  towards security. In one communication loop if one member at the sending/receiving end doesn't follow the security rules and protocols can expose the whole group  even if rest of the group members are taking security very seriously and strictly following security protocoals. 

 

 

Ali Palh

rhayman's picture

Thank you

Great list! Thanks to everyone for sharing and pointing to specific resources. I already knew of some of these, but not all. This is quite useful. I've been researching software tools specifically for use in the human rights and NGO fields, and summarized some of results already (with apologies for the self plug). Obviously there's some debate about the efficacy and value of each, but there's no doubting the need for these kinds of tools.

I've been following this entire conversation with interest. Keep it up!

 

wojtek's picture

How does security relate to information, communication & tech?

hi. wanted to share with you couple of thoughts..

one element that for me is very important in ICT security for human rights defenders (HRDs) is to put digital security in a process based framework. starting with bigger picture, integrating digital security with the overall protection plan HRDs may have. to understand how it falls into their work, into the context of the risk they face. and than carefully work on building security on the top of this. reviewing the physical security of the information, working on the foundation of the protection against malware, spy-ware, updating software or switching to free and open source software (however some times it is too much to ask from HRDs to switch entirely to Linux), exercising passwords skills (however simple this may seams), demystifying different elements of technology. and only than working the way towards more complex elements like encryption of the information on the computers and communications (email, web, text and voice chat), hiding the existence of the information on the computers (e.g. steganography) or "hiding" the communications (circumvention tools like TOR). it is important that this is the a process of many relatively simple elements working together.

digital security may seem overwhelming to many people. that is why, i think, the process based approach is helping. it is showing clear path. HRDs can decide how far they need, how far they are able (and some times how far they can) walk on this path. still one improves the security by taking even few steps in this process (for example just cleaning the computer from malware, and setting better passwords on the email accounts). of course the more steps you take the better :-)

there are times where taking too many steps on this path is risky. HRDs working in specific situation cant use some of the tool (e.g. encryption tools like GPG or secure email providers like VaultletSoft.com) as this may lead to increase of risk rather. but those decisions are possible only when one understands the implications of the usage of the tools, the logic behind the tools.

one other element that was interesting to see in our development of the 'security in a box' toolkit is that HRDs are very often lost in the abundance of the tools. they do not know which one to choose. this is why we decided to choose (in most of the cases) one tool to answer the given ICT security need. it may seem risky to put all the trust on one tool. but it actually let HRDs proceed.

Wojtek Bogusz
Information Security; Front Line - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; www.frontlinedefenders.org

nilsdybvig's picture

Is VoIP telephony secure?

I've really appreciated the breadth of experience in this dialogue, and since since you are on-line as a resource, I have a technical question for some of you with more expertise in these areas:  How secure is encrypted VoIP (Internet telephony) technology?  Is  this a secure communication tool that can be useful to HRDs, or is there reason for caution?  What practices do we need to enact to keep VoIP conversations secure?

Nils Dybvig
Christian Peacemaker Teams - Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz

gunner's picture

VOIP security

Nils, that's a great question. I'm not an expert on the subject, but I can tell you what I know:

Let's start with the obvious but important point: there is no totally secure system, anywhere, ever.

That said, encrypted VOIP *can* be pretty secure. Among other things it depends on:

  • Control of the originating and terminating VOIP servers: a big part of the game in encryption is controlling the machines that encrypt and decrypt. If those are boxes located in places you control or trust, with administrative access available only to yourself and those you trust, you're heading in the right direction.
  • You need to be sure that the keys/certificates used in the encryption have themselves not been compromised. If you're really thorough, you can always generate new ones when in doubt, though that's not always viable/advisable.
  • You want to be sure that the client machines, where the conversation is being input and output, are themselves secure machines, hopefully running a hardened OS like linux. You can do a perfect job of end-to-end encryption of a VOIP call, but if you're on a compromised Windows machine, it's entirely possible that the conversation can still be surveilled.
  • Skype is encrypted, but should NEVER be considered to be secure. We have no idea what happens to the data within the skype cloud.
  • In general, if your encryption solution is not 100% free/open source software that has been verified/certified by folks you trust to certify such things, you should not consider it secure.
  • A more advanced topic is anonymizing the end points; doing point-to-point voip calls has the disadvantage of linking those two machines in terms of IP traffic. Anything that can be done to anonomize those boxes is worth trying, though that's a tough one. TOR in particular won't in my experience give you adequate bandwidth, though I believe that's improving.

The above are just some key points; it is by no means a complete threat matrix by any means.

I welcome others with more knowledge to correct me and let me know what I left out :^)

Allen Gunn
Executive Director, Aspiration / www.aspirationtech.org

wojtek's picture

lets take an example of skype...

hi Nils, this is very good question. people ask a lot about security of communication over Skype, Google Talk and other tools. (since i don't want to recommend yahoo or msn i will not mention them here :-) maybe you want to discuss some other specific tools? than please bring the name in. below i will concentrate on skype as this is the most popular tool at the moment.

skype voice & text communication is encrypted when you communicate between two computers in the internet. so communication is much more secure than communication between two phones or mobile phones! [1] of course when you call from skype to the landline or mobile phones the last segment of the communication is carried unencrypted over the lines of the local telephone company, local to the phone number that you call. so one need to be aware of this.

important thing about skype (and other tools mentioned above) is that this is a proprietary tool. what means that we do not know what exactly it does with the information. we (as a internet community) have no access to the source code and we cannot independently verify it. and as far as i know there is no decent free and open source tool that can offer you VoIP. so we need to take special measures:

  • all computers used for any communication should be free from malware: spyware, adware, remote-controlled programs, worms, and computer viruses. also environment around you should be clean from listening devices, etc.
  • username and password used for Skype should not be used for anything else. of course password should be strong, changed often, etc.
  • you need to decide for yourself should skype username identify or have relationship to the user’s real name, organisation or occupation? you can have many different accounts to separate the groups that you work with. in case the account will be broken into. in this was you protect the network of the people you work with.
  • always have alternative ways for contacting each other – Skype can become unavailable in any moment.
  • always independently verify the identity of a person that you are communicating with. it is so easy to masquerade as someone else in the internet. especially when text chatting. so it is really important to be able to ask the question that only the person you would like to talk with is able to answer.
  • still it is important that you will be careful of what you say – maybe develop a code system - same as you mentioned for the mobile phones.
  • with skype it is also important to remember that by default it log down (stores on the disk of the computer) all the text chat that you have, and also all the history of the calls. it is possible to disable this and clean the history.


[1] skype is a product of US company so there is an open question how easy is to tap into communication over skype for US law enforcement agencies. there are many stories/rumours about this. i do not want to go into this here :-)

Wojtek Bogusz
Information Security; Front Line - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; www.frontlinedefenders.org

r p ruiz's picture

Securing VOIP: No Easy Answers, That's for Sure!

Greetings to Wojtek, Nils and Gunner!

I'm glad that Wojtek took a biG chunk out of important issues surring secure VOIP - It's a tough topic to address quickly, and requires both a high level and a low-level view of all the pieces, parts and participants in a relatively secure VOIP converstation.

Here are a couple of additional possibilities to consider, although they're not all neccessarily viable options for some:

  1. The simplest (but not cheap!) way to get easy and relatively secure VOIP and/or video conferencing is to get two cheap(er) mac laptops and install the ZFone point-to-point plugin http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zfone for encrypting VOIP clients that adhere to the SIP standard http://zfoneproject.com/prod_zfone.html.
  2. A cheaper approach would be to use GTalk with ZFone
  3. Or you could use Skype and take your chances.

While none of the possible solutions is optimal and/or completely free, each has its pros and cons:

  1. Mac laptops aren't cheap (~$1,000?), and you're implicitly trusting Apple's proprietary VOIP client to do the right thing with your voice data.  The one huge advantage it does have however is that it's trivially easy to set everything up.
  2. Using GTalk with ZFone is free, but you're also trusing Google's proprietary client to do the right thing with your voice data.
  3. Skype is secure (in theory), but it's not been audited, and they have proven themselves to be to not be trustworthy by helping the Chinese government to censor conversations about Falun Gong http://blog.valeso.org/2008/10/06/skype-messages-monitored-in-china/

The one bit of good news here is that ZFone addresses all kinds of esoteric VOIP security problems and weaknesses, and is the brainchild of Phil Zimmermann http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phil_Zimmermann . On top of that, it's incredibly elegant in the way it works and is extremely intuitive and easy to use with confidence.

So, with a bit of time, patience and luck, you may end up finding an Open Soure VOIP client that's compatible with ZFone and works on the operating system of your choice.  We're not asking for too much here, are we ;-)

Rick

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

wojtek's picture

Security in the Internet Cafe

Hi, Many human rights defenders that i train during recent years ask the questions about mobile phone - but this topic was covered by Nils, Rick and others already :-) So let me bring another question that i come across often, especially in the less developed countries: Is it secure to use internet café? For some defenders this will be the only way they can use Internet.

Security in internet café is a challenging topic, please treat recommendation below as conditional, that would apply only if possible in a given situation.

  • Consider which Internet cafés you are using. Think of the patterns of usage that you follow. Do they put you more at risk? Make best strategy according to the context of your environment. Consider using café that are not closest to your home/office. Consider random patterns.
  • Carefully choose which computer you use in the café, where is it, how is it orientated towards doors and windows. Do you see people approaching you before they will be able to see what you work on. Can anybody look behind your shoulder on your screen or on your keyboard. Make plan and exercise it of how will you close the applications and files in case of the emergency.
  • Choose Internet café where you are not asked to present your ID and where information about you are not logged.
  • The most important factor is that you choose Internet café that let you use your own laptop computer. With your own laptop you can use all kind of tools to protect yourself and encrypt information and connection. But still do not trust the connection.

All the items below are assuming that you use the computer from the Internet café:

  • Always put into consideration that the café manager could be snooping on your session screen.
  • Choose Internet café́ that uses Linux OS, or free and open source software tools like Firefox & OpenOffice.
  • Choose Internet café that uses legal Windows OS and updates all the software on the computers.
  • Choose Internet café that on all computers uses updated, good anti-virus, anti-spyware, firewall and that do not let users login with the administrators privileges.
  • Always clean traces of your work after you finish (use: Portable CCleaner or clean manually).
  • Choose Internet café that allows you to insert USB and run your own programs.
  • If possible, prepare your messages (to be sent) before you come to Internet café. If your addresses accept encrypted email, encrypt them beforehand.
  • Use portable Tor Browser for browsing the Internet.

Wojtek Bogusz
Information Security; Front Line - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; www.frontlinedefenders.org

kantin's picture

Recommended email service?

Thank you, Wojtek, and everyone else for so many great information security tips!  From now on, I will use internet cafes that let me use my own laptop!

My question for you all is - what email services do you recommend to have one's internet communication as secure as possible?  Also, what email services are not the best options for human rights defenders?

I use gmail which is nice because it allows me to access my email via SSL (https://mail.google.com/.....).  I have also heard that Rise Up is a good email service for defenders, and recommended by Security in a Box.  Are there other options?  Thanks!

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

r p ruiz's picture

Recommended Email Service: My Personal and Professional Opinion

Hi Kristin,

I have been using VaultletMail (which is a part of the "VaultletSuite 2 Go") on a daily basis for the last 5 years to protect both my personal and professional communications. I also use it as my main email system because I couldn't find what I wanted so I created it.  And I continue to improve and update the software on a daily basis.  So you could say that I'm intimately familiar and comfortable with how it's been designed and implemented :-)

What do I like about VaultletMail?  It's inherently multi-lingual, is built on an Open Source stack and runs on many, if not most, flavors of Windows, OS X and Linux.  It is easy to learn, adopt and use on a daily basis for non-technologists and is free for use by HRDs, activists, members of NGOs, journalists and academic institutions.  

It's also included and documented in the Security in a Box project (http://security.ngoinabox.org/en/vaultletsuite_main) and presents itself to its users in English, Spanish, Russian and French.  There is also exists the possibility and interest in having the interface translated into a number of other languages useful to HRDs in the near future.

Full disclosure: While the source code is owned by my company, VaultletSoft, it does come with a "source code for peer review license" similar to the one used by PGP.  The VaultletSuite 2 Go service is also hosted in the U.S.  I mention this because I have decided to release a completely free and Open Source version in late 2010 that NGOs and others can build and host for free in the jurisdiction of their choice. 

The Open Source version of the VaultletSuite 2 Go is currently called "Project Autonomy" whose goals and statement of purpose can be found here: http://www.valeso.org/ . If you are interested in collaborating on with me on "Project Autonomy", please let me know, there's plenty of room for all kinds of skills, interests and contributors.

So that's what I use - You are free to do so also: https://www.vaultletsoft.com/start/downloads.html

Rick

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

swillcox's picture

skype, email providers, etc

Thank you all for your very helpful list of resources and experience with Skype, cafes, on-line chats, etc.  This will be going to the hrds we work with.  And so helpful to our work as well.  In gratitude,

Sarah

IIE Scholar Rescue Fund

wojtek's picture

what email services do you recommend

hi Kristin, nice question :-)

from my point of view there are few factors to consider when you make a decision which email server you should use:

  • secure connection: does email server offers secure connection (for web-mail: https; and for email client: SSL or TLS enhanced versions of standard protocols like POP3, IMAP & SMPT). and secure connection should be use for all communication with the server, not only for login in.
  • location of the server: which jurisdiction it falls under? and what relevance does it have to the work of the user.  authorities local to the server may always put pressure on the server owners to reveal the information that is on it or is communicated through it.
  • trust in administrators and owners of the server: both in the more abstract sense of "do you share the same  values" but also in their technical abilities to protect the server against "hacking in". and of course one need to look carefully in the history of the practices of handling the information by the owners of the server.
  • needle in a haystack effect: sometimes you may consider a great server located in the good environment but you will be the only person who will use it from your country/community. sometimes it makes sense to blend in the crowd. of course without compromising above elements.

in 'security in a box' we recommend two excellent servers who's developers we know personally and trust relationship easier. both of them are located in US which may be ok for some people and completely not ok for others. both of them offers secure connection and both of the are not very widely used by majority of internet users:

www.riseup.net - if you are looking for the substitute with a server that is used by many people mail.google.com would be good choice now. i do not want to get into discussion "should we trust google". but seeing it from the point of view of blending in the crowd and with taking additional precautions (see below) this is a good choice now.

www.vaultletsoft.com - Rick wrote about it. basically it offers another layer of encryption. sort of encryption trick that you encrypt your email before it is being send from your computer. and only person who can decrypt it is the recipient of the message.
if you are looking for substitute to this option i suggest using gmail with GPG/PGP encryption software (for example Thunderbird + Enigmail + GPG). it is not super easy but offers very strong protection of the content of communication. again, by using this option one may put him/her self into risk because usage of those tools may be considered as a manifestation of bad intentions by local authorities.

there are also many other servers but to make it simple i will stop here with the listing of the servers.

than there you need to be sure that all the way to recipient your email is secure. you can protect your side. you can learn about tools, good practices, etc. but how about the recipient side of your email communication? you need to make sure that recipient understands this as well. you need to somehow almost educate the recipient. point to the right tools and practices. this is not easy.

let me add some general tips on the end of this already long message to inspire thinking on how to increase the security of the email communication:

  • wipe traces of work on the computer
  • use good password skills
  • use circumvention tools
  • maybe choose anonymous login name
  • analyse what you write, develop code system
  • never reply to, forward or even open spam and spoofing email
  • use several email accounts. e.g. for private communication and for signing up to Internet services
  • use BCC field when sending to a group of addresses
  • and of course make sure you have no spy ware and there is nobody snooping over the shoulder :-)


Wojtek Bogusz
Information Security; Front Line - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; www.frontlinedefenders.org

New Tactics's picture

What can defenders do to protect themselves?

  • How do we create effective protocols, emergency plans, and security policies?  
  • How do we integrate these protocols, plans and policies into an organization?  How can we effectively train staff on security policies?  How do you manage these plans and policies?
  • How can defenders utilize institutionalized policy mechanisms, advocacy mechanisms and protection mechanisms to create a safer environment (hold perpetrators accountable, develop standards, etc)?

Please share your thoughts and ideas by replying to this 'theme-comment'

Note: This dialogue is PUBLIC. Do not share any private or sensitive information. For advice on a specific situation, please contact a participant privately.

Sam mohochi's picture

How do we create effective protocols, emergency plans, and secur

The starting premise is that humnan rights work is a risky venture and at the organisational level this fact should be affirmed right at the point of recruitment.

my personal experience of over a decade is that one crucial question in interviews has been, you are aware of the sensitivity and risk involved with working with us have you discussed this with your family and are you comfortable with the fact that at times you might be exposed to risk owing to your association with this organisation.

i premise this to the fact that with the growth of human right we have had instances where employees come under risk only to blame the organisation without appreciating the fact that human rights work requires self committment and is not just any other wage paying job.

with staff fully appreciating security at this point makes it easy to collectively generate protocools, emmergency plans and security policies.

ownership by the team to internal mechanism is critical for success in implementation.

Marie Caraj's picture

How do we create effective protocols, emergency plans and secur

Hello Sam, Yes, I agree, that employees should be affirmed right at the being that there are risks involved and that the organisation has got a security policy that the employees have got to commit themselves to. A clause on the contract should mention it.

In the New Protection Manual for HRD by Protection International, Part II deals with organisational security which implies also individual co-responsibility. Organisations are made of people. A related question is raised at the end of the NPMHRD about ‘Security and Free Time" [pdf] where the question of ‘how much can an organisation interfere with private life’ is raised. Many cases of aggressions against HRD happen in the space between home and office.

Marie

kantin's picture

Learn to defend ourselves psychologically, physically, & legally

Ali, a wonderful New Tactics intern, did a great job of writing up easy-to-follow steps to learn self-defense for activists. She read the Self-Care and Self-Defense Manual for Feminists Activists and wrote this summary.

Ali Nardone wrote:

Self defense can be defined as a set of physical, psychological, and verbal techniques that can be used to defend oneself in situations where one may be a target of verbal assault, physical abuse, or rape. It also involves knowing how to avoiding certain situations where we know we may be hurt. Self defense skills are important knowledge for any activist, and the "Self-Care and Self-Defense Manual for Feminist Activists" (developed by Marina Bernal, Artemisa, and Elige), contains step by step instructions on how we can implement these skills in our everyday activist work. There are three types of self defense: psychological, physical, and legal.

In her post, Ali highlights the three principles of psychological self defense, the eight steps to follow if you feel you are in danger of being physically attacked, and the important things to know about legal defense.  Read her post to get an intro to the manual...and then read the manual!

What other resources are out there that relate to self-defense for activists?

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

Revolutions's picture

Self-Defence

Kristin,

This is a brilliant resource, and one I turn to again and again for reference in our trainings. I love that they see self-defence on so many levels and see it as an integral concept for human rights defenders security.

One of the things that I've run into in using the term self-defence in the hrd security context, is that this can be perceived negatively -- which was a surprise for me until I finally realized that it is a gendered term. For some, the idea of 'self-defence' immediately conjures up images of violence -- the use of aggressive martial arts techniques, a la Chuck Norris and nunchucks flying. I recently spoke with a very experienced woman human rights defender who was told that self-defence techniques should not be taught because they were aggressive. Even if this is not obviously the resistance, the perception remains that only a professional should teach self-defence techniques continues to make it seem like a special art and a mystery. 

Of course, self-defence is nothing of the sort. Every single human rights defender is defending themselves, and others, every single day. They are using so many amazing techniques, tactics and strategies. Women human rights defenders in particular, as women, know what it means to defend themselves on so many levels. One of the best ways to talk about self-defence in this context is simply to ask women human rights defenders -- what have you done to protect yourself in your life when you were attacked physically and/or verbally? This question, among a group of women, will automatically trigger a barrage of fascinating and very practical stories -- because the reality of women's lives, and the lives of many LGBTIQQ defenders, as well as others, is that we face attacks in our lives, and we automatically, instinctively defend ourselves. 

So, I would really like to see more practical self-defence trainings that help human rights defenders uncover and recognize their own internal resources to defend themselves.

Self-defence, when taught well, is about discovering your own power, your own voice. It is also about understanding violence. There are specific techniques you can learn, of course. But the best ones are the ones you already know. One of the best points my self-defence instructor taught us (an Aikido Sensei for 20+ years) was this -- in a crisis, the best use of self-defence is not having to use it at all -- there is no shame in 'running away'. Avoiding conflict can be a powerful tactic, among many others.

matthew easton's picture

national defender organizations

Great discussion! In a number of countries human rights organizations have come together to create joint initiatives focused on defender protection. They can be an important source of

  • joint training
  • relocation and emergency funds
  • national and international advocacy

They can also be a useful bridge between the international community and grassroots defenders who often lack the global networks of urban activists. 

 Such an organization requires human and material resources from national groups and financial support from the funding community, which could have been devoted to other activities. However if the body emerges from the needs of defenders and has a clear mission, it can play an important role. Such groups have emerged in Latin America and East Africa , and I'm sure they are in many other regions as well. It would be great to hear from some of those groups, and those who work with them, about their experiences. 

kantin's picture

The power of an organized network of defenders

Thanks for adding this idea of creating joint initiatives/networks on a local or national level for defenders, Matthew!  Though I am not familiar with specific examples of such networks, I have an idea for how these kinds of networks can be utilized by defenders to assist in the protection of defenders on the ground:

Otpor! (“Resistance!” in Serbo-Croatian) prepared “Plan B” demonstrations outside of police stations to respond immediately to arrests during protest events in Serbia. Whenever the police arrested activists in their demonstrations, Otpor! would instantaneously launch a second operation, mobilizing more people to show up at the police stations and protest the arrest. The events at the police station became media showpieces, calling attention to the injustice of the arrests and the illegitimacy of the regime. They also provided moral support and encouragement to the arrested activists, turning them into local and national heroes, rather than forgotten victims. Otpor! thus turned the regime’s policy of arrests to its own advantage and continued to build a movement.

This tactic is a great example of how defenders can protect fellow defenders by organizing themselves and putting pressure on officials.  The 'people' that Otpor! called to come to the police stations were fellow defenders and supporters.  It was part of plan - part of the strategy.  They were expecting these calls, and when they received it, they knew exactly what to do. 

You can read more about why Otpor chose this tactic, how they implemented it, and what the challenges were in our tactical notebook: Plan B: Using Secondary Protests to Undermine Repression

Please share other examples of how networks of defenders can be mobilized for specfiic protection actions!

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

kantin's picture

Using phones & social media to share critical info

We know that as human rights defenders, we must be very careful about how we use social media and our mobile phones. Facebook, Twitter, and using mobile phones can compromise the safety of defender.  However, in certain circumstances, they can be that critical link to share information to an organized network.  Chris Mishek, in a post titled Egyptian activists’ use of mobile phones to alert their networks of harassment or arrest by police, wrote about several examples of how Egyptian activists have used Twitter, Facebook and mobile phones to protect defenders:

chrismishek wrote:

Activists, bloggers, journalists and students in Egypt are using their mobile phones to alert their networks if they are in danger or have been arrested using SMS text messaging and the micro-blogging service Twitter. Egyptian activists who have informed their network of arrest by police have proved this to be an effective means of getting the word out quickly of their detention so that fellow activists can pressure the government for a quick release, or mount a longer-term campaign in the result of formal charges.

When American student James Karl Buck was in Mahallah on April 10, 2008 covering the continuing textile strike he was arrested by police along with his Egyptian translator. On the way to the police station Buck alerted his contacts using Twitter by posting the word “Arrested.” When Egyptian journalist and blogger Hossam el-Hamalawy got word via twitter of Buck’s arrest he started posting updates on Buck’s status, further spreading the word. While Buck was released within 24 hours, his translator Mohammed Maree was detained for more than 3 months. Maree said he had been beaten and electrically shocked throughout his detention by Egyptian authorities. While Maree was detained, Buck petitioned US and Egyptian authorities for his release and used Twitter, blog posts and websites to spread information.

Another famous tweeting incident in Egypt involved the Egyptian opposition group Kefaya and blogger Malek Mustafa. At a Cairo protest, Mustafa was arrested and being driven away by police. Different activists had used SMS and Twitter to track the path of the police car, and another activist on his home computer was able to post the Twitter messages on Kefaya’s homepage. Using this information Kefaya activists were able to surround the police car and get Mustafa released.

Another tactic activists have used in Egypt is publishing dedicated hotline numbers set up by Egyptian human rights organizations and phone numbers of volunteer human rights lawyers prior to demonstrations. Activists published these numbers on their blogs and facebook pages prior to the April 6, 2008 strike in order for protestors to have a place to call using their mobile phones if they were harassed or arrested. Prior to other demonstrations these numbers have been recirculated by bloggers and activists using the internet and Twitter.

In New York City, a project called Holla Back was created to collect video and information on street harrassment via mobile phone. I'm not exactly sure how this would fit into a security strategy, but I thought it sounded like an interesting project.

What other ways can the use of mobile phones and organized networks protect defenders?  Or, are these tactics too dangerous?

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

nilsdybvig's picture

Using cellphones for security while travelling

Cell phones are an important tool for the work of most HRDs, but they are also easily  compromised: I’m told the technology needed to listen in on other people’s cell phone calls is readily available.  How can HRDs keep their cell phone calls from becoming a security liability?
 
In my accompaniment work our protocol was to call in at least once a day to check in with teammates.  The check-in call lets co-workers know where you are, and that nothing has happened to you.  We also had a protocol in place for what to do if someone in the field failed to call in as expected: the protocol listed who to call for more information, who should be notified if we believed that a team was in crisis, and names of people or organizations that may be able to provide us with support.

Other than checking in to say that we were OK, however, we always had to be careful about what information we shared, which usually kept our check-in calls short.  Any information about where you are, where you are going, who is with you, or what you have observed can be a potential security liability.  

I would encourage HRDs to develop code words for talking about situations they may encounter in the field.  Always assume that people who oppose can hear your phone conversations.  Consider a code that uses phrases from everyday conversation so that a coded conversation doesn’t stand out from a normal exchange.  Practice using the code, but practice in person rather than over the phone, so that you don’t give away clues that you are using a code to a potential eavesdropper.

Codes can be broken.  Perhaps more important than using a code is refraining from saying too much over the phone.  Develop an itinerary and leave it with a co-worker before you go somewhere, that way you can just say “I’m here” when you arrive.  Don’t mention other people who are with you or whom you have seen.  Take notes if necessary, but save the longer discussions for when you can have the conversation in person.


Nils Dybvig
Christian Peacemaker Teams - Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz

r p ruiz's picture

Cell Phones: Insecure by Design

Hi Nils,

I agree with your comments about the importance of using code words and saving vital conversations for face-to-face encounters (wherever possible).

Here's where I'll split hairs a bit with you though: Cell phones are more than easily compromised, they are insecure by design.  To make matters worse, the telcos on whose networks they depend are often implicitly, if not explicitly, affiliated/allied with the State against whose interests an HRD may be working.

HRDs and activists using them should assume that everything they say (or text!) is public information.  Further, they reveal far more about you than you might think.

To help illustrate all that cell phones reveal about us, I've put together a brief presentation that can be found here: https://www.vaultletsoft.com/ppt/cell-phones-and-activism/ 

Rick

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

nilsdybvig's picture

GPS cell phones


I don't know a lot about cellphones, so I was surprised to read in your presentation that the exact  position of GPS cell phones can be located by others. 

I'm assuming that most standard (low-end) cellphones like the ones we use in our accompaniment work would not have this capacity, and that if your phone was GPS enabled it would say so prominently on the packaging.  Is that correct, or do we need to be taking the battery out of our cellphones when we don't want to broadcast our location?

I agree with your distinction that cell pones are insecure by design, not just by accident.  In Colombia we quickly learned that the military  knew the content of our cellphone conversations, and we assume that other armed actors are able to intercept our calls as well.

Nils Dybvig
Christian Peacemaker Teams - Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz

r p ruiz's picture

GPS: (More) Exact Location Capacity

Hi Nils,

Thanks for posting the working URL to the online presentation.

I should have put an asterisk on the word "exactly" in the presention, which is something that usually do when discussing this in person.  In this case the asterisk would have denoted: "more precise location capacity than standard cell phone tower triangulation calculations".  According to Wikipedia, GPS systems can locate us to within a 20 meter wide circle around our location: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS , while cell phone tower triangulation varies wildly: http://searchengineland.com/cell-phone-triangulation-accuracy-is-all-ove...

With regards to whether a given cell phone has GPS capacity, the best way to check it out is to google for the specs if the unit doesn't make it clear one way or another.  My working assumption is that everything we use is insecure unless we take measures to mitigate our insecurity or confirm our desired level of security.  In the case of GPS, I'd assume that it's enabled by default (if we have it), since ease-of-use trumps security in 99.9999 of 100 cases.  So now our work is doubled because we want to disable it after we ascertain whether we have it or not.  This is something that takes a bit of patience and fortitude, as every model has differing and multiple levels of menu mazes that we'd have to work though just to find the "GPS OFF" option ;-)

Your question about taking out the battery is a good one, because it does disable to a fairly high level of certainty* the capacity to eavesdrop and/or locate us. This was the first thing that popped into my head when talking this through with HRDs for the first time.  And then I realized that this also tells those who might be monitoring that you're on to them.  So it's probably better to have somebody who's not at an important meeting take your cell phone for a walk in the park (or just leave it at home or some other safer place) so that now you appear to be behaving "normally", whatever that may mean to both you and a potential observer.

Rick

p.s.: And now for this post's asterisk: believe it or not, some (but not many) cell phones actually have two batteries: The main one that you can easily take out and replace, and a second tiny one designed to keep some settings alive in memory when you take out the main battery for replacement.  Not that this is common, but as the the kind of guy who looks both ways when crossing a one-way street, I feel compelled to be thorough.  Here's a link to one of my blog posts on cell phone security for further background reading if you're interested: http://blog.valeso.org/2008/11/23/locating-cell-phones-without-telco-coo...

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

kantin's picture

Protect your phone using the Guardian Project

Rick, Nils and others - this is a very interesting threads on the insecurity of mobile phones. Have either of you heard of the Guardian Project?

The Guardian Project aims to create easy to use apps, open-source firmware MODs, and customized, commercial mobile phones that can be used and deployed around the world, by any person looking to protect their communications from unjust intrusion....This project gives power to regular people to own and control their mobile phones without being afraid they are their own worsed enemy.


Here is a quote from their website on how this phone application can be helpful for human rights defenders:

"An undercover human rights researcher traveling through a remote region without mobile data service is able to use their Guardian phone to document local conditions (via camera phone or audio recording) while seeming to just be making phone calls or checking a text message. Data captures is stored encrypted on the device or a removable SD card. If the researcher is detained by a local militia force, they can easily wipe the device, or if unable to, be assured that all data is securely encrypted, and near impossible to crack without significant computing resources. In addition, the names and phone numbers of people they have been in contact with are not revealed to the local forces, safeguarding those who they intended to help in the first place."

The creator of the Guardian Project, Nathan Freitas, participated in our January 2010 dialogue on 'Documenting Violations: Choosing the Right Approach.'  Within this dialogue, there is a great thread on mobile phones where he shared a lot of useful information on 'how mobile phones can facilitate the safety/security of documentation' - much of which can be applied to any conversation on security and mobile phones. 

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

r p ruiz's picture

Guardian Project: Intriguing!

Hi Kristin,

While I've heard of the project, I don't know enough to comment on it other than to say that my interest is now definitely and officially piqued!

Thanks for posting the link, I'll be certain to follow it up.

Rick

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

UAF Saira's picture

Insecure Email Accounts

Thank you all for sharing such great information on tech security!  This Guardian Project seems amazing.  I am eager to read the CREA self-defense manual - so thanks to Ali and Kristin for that posting.

I have a question regarding insecure email accounts such as hotmail and yahoo.  As I understand, these are not encrypted accounts and much easier to hack into or monitor than gmail, riseup, or hushmail.  However, many activists with whom we work still use hotmail and yahoo accounts.  Is this cause for concern?  If so, what is the best way to communicate this concern without being prescriptive?  Is email ever really secure?

Thanks again everybody for this fantastic dialogue.  I have learned so much already.

Gratefully,

Saira

wojtek's picture

hi Saira, IMHO yes, it is a

hi Saira, IMHO yes, it is a "cause for concert" when activists are using insecure (no encryption of the connection) email account, managed by companies with bad record in security and history of cooperation with oppressive governments for handling the sensitive communications.

but yours are very important questions: "what is the best way to communicate this concern without being prescriptive?" i suppose the way to approach it is to make people realise what is the nature of the risk. here in this dialogue we (or at least I) may sound a bit "short" and therefore "prescriptive". as we are (or at least I am) trying to summarise the points. but i believe that if you can explain the problem well and with the compassion people naturally tend to look for a solution. of course you may not have this luxury of time to explain things. what shall you do than? give up on your security standards? i do not think so. i tend to point to the toolkit that we wrote (and other resources) and insist on keeping the standards (e.g. asking that HRD to open email account on other, more secure server).

another question you raised is "Is email ever really secure?". it was written already on this page, it is a very long page by now :-) , that 100% security does not exist. but the security is a process. with each step you make your communication become more secure. if you understand the value of your information and the nature of the digital threads you will be able to choose how many steps you should take. and the steps are described in many good guides. i think it is possible to make email communication very secure - but it requires some investments: time, learning, preparation, being very careful and always questioning security of each action you take.

Wojtek Bogusz
Information Security; Front Line - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; www.frontlinedefenders.org

r p ruiz's picture

The Case for Being Pro/Prescriptive: Health and Well Being

Hi Saira,

As usual, Wojtek's responses are well thought out and reasonable ;-)  And I really like his comments about continually taking steps forward, one at a time, on a never-ending path towards being more, yet never quite 100%, secure.

Just to play devil's advocate, I'd like to rephrase one of your questions from "what is the best way to communicate this concern without being prescriptive?" to "what is the best way to change this undesirable behavior?"

I like to use the preventative health care metaphors when discussing computer security, as most people are familiar them:  How did we as adults develope the good habits of washing our hands and brushing our teeth? Why do we (usually) lock the door to out homes and/or cars?  Why do most of us not drink and drive? We learned these behaviors from others, like our parents, teachers, family and friends, who knew that by doing these things we would be healthier and safer.

We do these things not only because they're good for us, but also because somewhere along the way after being educated as to the advantages of doing these things, people who cared about us reminded, nudged, pecked, cajoled and scolded us along the way.  Those of us who still didn't "get with the program" (change our behaviors) were leaned on by somebody with enough power to say to us: "do these things that are good for you or else _______________ will, or will not, happen.

Now, in the case of supporting activists with insecure email accounts, we're not just talking about doing things that are good or desirable for one individual - we're talking about potentially dangerous behavior that can quite literally affect the safety and well being of many other people in addition to materially affecting the outcomes of the projects we're supporting. Why do I use the word "dangerous"? Because we're all in this together (as in a boat), and the weakest link is usually the first attack point of choice.

So there's nothing wrong with proscribing the use of Hotmail and Yahoo mail accounts, while simultaneously offering free alternatives like Gmail, Riseup, VaultletMail, Enigmail, etc. There's simply no excuse for not doing something that's as free as these solutions and as easy as Gmail and Riseup.  In fact, once you have patiently educated them you are completely within your rights to begin reminding, nudging, pecking, cajoling, scolding and outright censuring whomever doesn't do the Right Thing(tm).

Of course, it would be easier if you could get somebody else to play the heavy for you:  I once led a workshop where both the group leaders and rank and file activists where in the same room at the same time.  When somebody in the rank and file complained about leaving their beloved insecure bulk webmail account behind in exchange for a free and protected transmission Gmail account, one of the leaders stood up in front of everybody and said something along the lines of "you will not place us at risk by continuing to use that email account.  From this day forward, we will all use Gmail and VaultletMail accounts, according to the kind of information we're handling."

I was so happy that I almost fainted ;-)

 

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

nilsdybvig's picture

Link to cell phones and activism presentation

It looks like there was a typo in Rick's link; I was able to access his presentation here:

https://www.vaultletsoft.com/ppt/cell-phones-and-activism/

Nils Dybvig
Christian Peacemaker Teams - Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz

Michele Braley's picture

is there a use for unsecure communication?

I am grateful for all of the tech experts on this dialogue.  Each new technology brings its many benefits but also adds to our work as we have to develop new security protocols.

With a dialogue focused on security, I think it can be easy to overlook the possible benefits of communicating in an unsecure fashion.  As we look to hide and encrypt and code our communication, for good reason, we might forget to think about times when it makes us safer for others to hear our conversation,   Are there times when being open about location, for example, actually makes people safer.  Although our default conversation is usually about hiding our communication in order to be more secure, we should also remember to ask ourselves, "is there a benefit to others hearing/reading this communication?"   Asking ourselves, for example, would we and our partners be safer if our location was known to the armed groups in this instance?

Michele Braley

United States

wojtek's picture

security should be based on openness rather than obscurity

hi Michele, very true. sometimes making a case public, known to local, national and international community may decrease the risk. interestingly the analogy goes also into ICT design. i think Gunner (a.k.a. Allan ;-) wrote about it somewhere on this page. the strategy of openness is used in free and open source software movement. where security is not based on "obscurity" but rather on believe that making software source open will allow many people to improve it in much more efficient way. it may seem risky at first, and it probably is for the new projects with small community. but as the projects get momentum, community that is interested in it gets larger this becomes an incredibly strong asset. and actually a prerequisite of good (real) security.

Wojtek Bogusz
Information Security; Front Line - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; www.frontlinedefenders.org

r p ruiz's picture

If Nothing Else...

Hi Michele,

If nothing else, engaging in ongoing insecure communication (where appropriate) can help to provide an image of "business as usual", or normalcy, to those who might be monitoring such things.

Believe me, as a technologist, I completely understand your comments about "more work... to develop new security protocols.".  Because there is so much going on "out there" in terms of security, activism, human rights and software development (among other interesting and important things), that at times I feel like I'm drinking from a firehose.  And that's when I go for a ride on my bike or take a walk in the woods before I jump back into it :-)

Speaking of which...

Rick

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

kantin's picture

East & Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project/Network

The group in East Africa is called East & Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project/Network:

EHAHRDP offers technical, legal, psycho-social and financial support to human rights defenders facing immediate risk in their home countries. A thorough assessment of each case is made gathering information about eminent risks and most effective avenues of mitigation. This can be issuing a public statement to draw international attention on a case or in high risk cases the temporary evacuation of the defender from his/her country. Considering the prevalence of threats on HRDs in the countries of the sub-region, the protection programme has been able to assist over 100 HRDs throughout the sub-region.

This project has developed a Resource Book for Human Rights Defenders.  It would be great to hear about other networks that defenders can use as a resource!

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

swillcox's picture

Alertnet

Another resource that may be helpful in tracking human rights concerns is Reuters' Alertnet. You can choose the types of alerts you receive, on a weekly, daily and I think even of the minute updates. You can choose geographically and topically.

http://www.alertnet.org/

- Sarah

Jeanne.Sarson's picture

HRD Safety and security in the public and private spheres

I would like to add to the dimensions of this extensive informative discussion that being a human rights defender extends/mixes/exists/ crosses over into both so-called public and private spheres, in a state and non-state context. Depending on the country environment and situations human right defenders in both spheres can be confronted with risks to safety and security that may be considered more ‘passive’ in the private sphere versus ‘active’ in the public sphere, but can be/are still effective for the violator’s goal of silencing HRDers and removing their support from those whose human rights are being violated.


For example, the reality of state actor torture has been discussed, torture that happens in the so-called public sphere, however, non-state actor torture is also inflicted in the private or domestic sphere and the perpetrators can and do operate in both spheres. For those who work defending the human rights of persons so victimized in the private sphere, the HRDer’s risks can be invisibilized even though these risks can be a result of state actor’s intentional and purposeful actions. For instance, a state actor may use their public sphere positional power to discredit a private professional HRDer in order to attempt to stop the HRDer’s involvement in disclosing the occurrence of such a human rights violation. This abuse of power and corruption is a useful and effective tactic of perpetrators operating in both public and private spheres. It is a risk professional HRD can face. It will not kill, as tragically occurs in many countries, but it can cause much harm not only to the HRD professional but also to those whose human rights they try to defend. It can cause ‘battle fatigue’, cause financial and relational distress, marginalization, social/professional isolation and a spiritual dilemma for the HRDer and sadly cause HRDers to vicariously withdraw their HRs grass root support for persons so victimized.


So, when analysing and mapping the risks not only do violations/corruptions of the Rule of Law occur but also violations/corruption of the ‘Rule of Policy’ such as institutional policies that informs basic dignities of citizen’s ‘every day’ universal rights. Because a pattern of violation and corruption at this level strains the survival/life of the person who has endured non-state actor torture, maybe not directly from the perpetrators who abused positional power in both the public and the private spheres, but from suicidality and other Self-harming responses . When the duality of risks that can occur in both the public and the private spheres are invisibilized, I believe safety and security issues are not dually visibilized.


Thanks for the discourse.


Respectfully,


Jeanne Sarson, Canada

Jeanne Sarson, Canada

kantin's picture

Front Line Emergency Support for defenders

Hello all,

I just wanted to be sure that everyone here knows that Front Line Defenders offer several ways to contact them for emergency support.  The following information is taken from the Front Line website:


Emergency Support

Phone Support: Front Line seeks to provide 24 hour support to human rights defenders at immediate risk. If there is a crisis you can contact Front Line at any hour on the emergency hotline at (+353 1 21 00 489)

Skype Me™! Call Front Line emergency hotline number over Skype at any hour (skype user name: front-line-emergency)

The emergency service gives human rights defenders an option to be forwarded to someone speaking Arabic, English, French, Russian or Spanish who will be able to mobilise rapid international support and action .

Urgent actions can include faxed or phoned appeals to the relevant authorities, raising the case through the EU or individual government representatives, practical help with temporary relocation, assistance with medical or legal expenses.

Secure Email Support: Human rights defenders in need of urgent assistance can also email Front Line through a secure and encrypted channel: secure contact form.

Front Line Advocacy:

Front Line is always guided by the wishes of the human rights defender when taking any action. The defender and/or their family members or colleagues are best placed to decide what type of action is most likely to be effective in their specific context.

In most cases expressions of international concern are perceived to have a beneficial effect. Human Rights Defenders often report that even where such concern does not lead to an immediate solution it can result in better treatment because the authorities know that someone is following what is happening with the case.

Torture and ill treatment are most likely to occur in the first days of detention so speedy action can be very important. However, where human rights defenders believe publicity or international attention could be counterproductive, Front Line will be guided by the wishes of the human rights defenders on the ground.

Expressions of international concern and questions about what is happening with a case can also have a long term preventive effect. Human rights defenders report that the authorities are often less likely to repeat the repressive measures if they know they are likely to provoke a reaction. International action can also give moral support and solidarity to human rights defenders and encourages them to continue their work.

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

New Tactics's picture

What do the rest of us need to do to protect defenders?

  • How can organizations better support security for human rights defenders?  How can we create a stronger network of human rights defenders to make them more visible?
  • How can funders/donors better support security of defenders?
  • How can the larger 'protection framework' of international and regional mechanisms do to better protect defenders?
  • What support practices are working well?  What are not working?  Share best practices and ideas.

Please share your thoughts and ideas by replying to this 'theme-comment'

Note: This dialogue is PUBLIC. Do not share any private or sensitive information. For advice on a specific situation, please contact a participant privately.

gunner's picture

We're all in this together. Like a lifeboat.

The main thing we stress in security discussions is that each person's actions impact others in any security-relevant network. Each of our digital footprints leads to one another's virtual doors, and data we store, names and terms we mention and search, the sites we visit and the places we access the internet can all adversely impact allies as well as ourselves.

  • What can organizations do? Be proactive in supporting a security-positive culture, with lots of training and ongoing dialog. Provide hardened Linux machines, with TOR and OTR enabled, and force people off Windows, Macs and proprietary mobiles when security really matters. Security is a set of values to be engendered and shared, not a pizza to be delivered. Understand the risks of data retention, have appropriate policies in place, and FOLLOW THEM. Allocate the ongoing time for staff to operate securely; TOR browsing takes longer than insecure browing, security tools take time to learn and install, security culture is a chronometrically consuming discipline just like a garden is. Both take time to blossom and sustain.
  • What can funders do? Stay anonymous when necessary. Stay humble. Stay out of the way. We all understand that funders need to demonstrate impact and justify investments to assuage upstream stakeholders and sustain brand, but when possible disassociate yourself from the work of defender grantees unless there is explicit tactical benefit in all directions. Encourage grantees to write security costs and corresponding organizational development into all grant proposals, and then fund it. Let grantees tell you what to say and what not say about their work, and when to say it. Be coachable, not aloof, in supporting your investments. :^)
  • How can the larger 'protection framework' of international and regional mechanisms do to better protect defenders? Prioritize education equally with infrastructure sourcing. Help ALL users to understand how infrastructure impacts security and effectiveness. Be tactically transparent about the vulnerabilities in layers you provide or support. Keep it all free and open source. There is no such thing as a proprietary security layer. And always know your work is essential, and thus worth putting up with the thankless, underfunded bullsh*t of keeping is sustained.

Overall, the sad and sanity-preserving truth is that only to way to operate with substantial safety online is to assume that any data that ever achieves digital state (and even that which hasn't yet) has the potential to become a matter of public record, whether regionally, nationally or internationally. It sucks that no security or anonymity technology is fully "betrayal proof". When in doubt, leave it out, or at least offline. And like an athlete striving to stay in shape, or an artist always seeking to improve their method, never cease to study your security discipline like a cat studies an inanimate object before pouncing on it. Or least that's what the little critter next to me just demonstrated :^)

Allen Gunn
Executive Director, Aspiration / www.aspirationtech.org

edna.aquino's picture

Making security tools and systems usable and accessible

Im trying to imagine how all the tools and knowledge that have been generated over the years especially on security and protection of HRDs are usable by small human rights orgs and by individual HRDs given the cost implications of building these security infrastructures and systems.  I'm trying to imagine how ngos and hrds operating in hand-to- mouth subsistence can cope given that many can't even afford to purchase brand-new PCs to replace the hand-me- downs from their partners abroad; purchase the licence for the basic software needed for what many would consider as 'more essential' work (I've seen some using pirated softwares); on top of not being able to pay their own salaries. These are the the lived realities of many grassroots activist organisations in many parts of the world especially those in inaccesible areas where access to power supply and technology is erratic .  Are there security tools available with minimum or zero costs we could offer them?      

Edna O. Aquino

"Violence is not our culture"/ Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women

 

Michele Braley's picture

security protocol recommendations

Hi All,

This dialogue has made it clear how much technology is available to us and the effort involved in having a security protocol that stays current with the changing ICT landscape.  I would suggest two steps organizations can make to be more secure.

1) The security protocol needs to name the person(s) or position(s) responsible for monitoring new technologies and new security protocols and for updating passwords, codes, etc.  Without specific plans in place to keep the protocol updated and in line with the times, the work of updating the protocol can easily be forgotten in the urgency of the other demands on our time.

2) If you work for an international NGO, develop relationships with trusted local advisers, and meet regularly with them for their assessment of security risks.   This could also be a method for sharing what you are learning about ICT security, if your partners have less access to this type of information. 

 

 

gunner wrote:

 

  • What can organizations do? Be proactive in supporting a security-positive culture, with lots of training and ongoing dialog. Provide hardened Linux machines, with TOR and OTR enabled, and force people off Windows, Macs and proprietary mobiles when security really matters. Security is a set of values to be engendered and shared, not a pizza to be delivered. Understand the risks of data retention, have appropriate policies in place, and FOLLOW THEM. Allocate the ongoing time for staff to operate securely; TOR browsing takes longer than insecure browing, security tools take time to learn and install, security culture is a chronometrically consuming discipline just like a garden is. Both take time to blossom and sustain.

 

Michele Braley

United States

kantin's picture

Some security tools for HRDs with min cost

Hi Edna - great question!  Yes, there are many great security tools that are "free" for anyone to use that are great resources for human rights defenders.  These tools may not cost any money to purchase, but I put "free" in quotations because of course it still takes the time and energy of someone to research, choose, install and configure these tools. Also, many of these tools are not "free" to develop so it is always good to donate money to the development of these tools as much as we can.  Lastly, in my attempt to list some helpful tools to look at, I want to emphasize Gunner's comment above that "Security is a set of values to be engendered and shared, not a pizza to be delivered." 

Many of the "free" tools are Open Source Software (but not all).  For example, this website is based on the content management system (CMS) called Drupal, which is open source software.  Drupal is free and public.

To find good, "free" security tools, a good place to start looking is on the Security in a Box website (a project by Tactical Tech).  This is a great list of Open Source security tools AND information on how to set it up AND examples of how they can be used.  How great is that?  Here are some examples of the tools listed:

Of course, none of these are completely unbreakable (nothing is), but they can be very useful.  Edna, you also mentioned that often defenders are burdened with having to purchase software for work.  I would recommend that you take a look at Open Office (it is like Microsoft Office, but Open and free).  Today there are more and more free and open versions of popular software.  I hope this is helpful!

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

wojtek's picture

there is no free security, but there is a free choice..

hi, there will always be some cost associated with the security. either it is money or time spend to implement it, learn it and use it. it is the same in the non digital world and for the ICT security. but the most important is to realise that the change for better is possible. both if you have founds to spend for it or not. as others wrote here there are free tools to implement, there are also free guides to learn how to use them. guides written for the non experienced users. let me name some:

despite of the fact that most of those materials are self learning toolkits, of course best is to have someone who can come and conduct risk assessment and needs analysis together with HRD. someone who will take all this materials (and more) add own experience and prepare custom training and implementation process. this is always the best. it is best to have a local person who can visit you, who speak your language, who understand the local political, social and cultural context. that is what we are doing in 'security in a box', cooperating and creating a network of trainers who work in many languages across the world. i think that HRDs and HR organisations but also the international organisation and founders working with them have to gather resources, trusted people who can support them defenders.

on the top of this, i think that international organisations have primary responsibility of keeping the security standards high. it is both in the communication and also in proposing to local partner that projects that they have with the local partners include the trainings in security also trainings of the trainers. in this way each project will educate at least one person who is left behind, who can follow-up on the security side, who will be longer term asset.

Wojtek Bogusz
Information Security; Front Line - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; www.frontlinedefenders.org

nilsdybvig's picture

Making security tools and systems usable and accessible

I appreciate the great information on technological solutions that Allen (We're all in this together. Like a lifeboat.) Kristin (Some security tools for HRDs with min cost) and Ali (Secure Communication) have been sharing.  I'll definitely mention this dialouge to some of Christian Peacemaker Teams technology support people.  It makes a lot of sense to use some of these Open, readily available tools to improve our data security.   But I also agree with Edna that it can be a challenge for huamn rights organizations with limited resources to implement these tools.  It would be great if funders would provide some additional resources for tech resources, but I think many HR organizations struggle to come up with the funds just to stay afloat.  If we feel we have to choose between upgrading our technology and defending human rights,  we'll almost certainly choose the latter. 

One challenge that many HR organizations face is finding trustworthy Information Technology (IT) support.  Computer systems are only going to be as secure as the IT staff who design and maintain them.  With CPT's work in Colombia, many times we were forced to choose between buying a plane ticket for an IT support person to come to the project from the United States, or learning to install and maintain security and communications software ourselves.  And let's be honest, the skillset and interests that make a person a good human rights worker, often do not overlap well with the skills required to build and support a secure computer system.  CPT's Colombia Team has had to work hard to develop these skills internally, to avoid having to invite relatively unknown IT support people into our offices.  As a result, our security is pretty good, but we still have to rely, where at all possible, on limiting the amount of sensitive information we record and transmit.

We need to be careful about relying too much on computers systems that are only as secure as the people maintaining them. Sometimes the older, simpler technologies are safer and more secure.  I don't take a laptop into the field, I take an inexpensive pad of paper: it never runs out of power, it won't break, and it's easy to shred or burn after it is no longer needed.  Meeting in person with associates is almost always preferable to talking over the phone if security issues are going to be involved, and as others have mentioned, sometimes almost any discussion can impact security. 

 

Nils Dybvig
Christian Peacemaker Teams - Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz

Marie Caraj's picture

Making security tools and systems usable and accesible

Quoting Nils : “Sometimes the older, simpler technologies are safer and more secure. Instead of typing them up on a laptop, notes from a meeting can be kept in a cheap pad of paper that is burned after it is no longer needed. Meeting in person with associates is almost always preferable to talking over the phone if security issues are going to be involved, and as others have mentioned, sometimes almost any discussion can impact security”.

Maybe it helps if hrds working together, decide what is the ‘top secret information’ (shades can be agreed for the other categories of information, such as internal but not security sensitive and ‘public’ information and/or other/ more categories).
Example, an organisation could decide that: the true ‘top secret’ information is "names of key witnesses unknown to the potential aggressor", knowing that facts are known by the potential aggressor as probably it have contributed to them. Key witnesses are therefore the 'added value/ determining element', so to speak). Names correspond to a percentage of information that can easily either be learnt by heart or secured otherwise.
This doesn’t mean that hrd should not develop capacities in IT. It means: integrating in one’s security plan and management, the vulnerability of IT security (and viceversa, vulnerability of the other means each time IT security is implemented).

Maybe the point is also to avoid habits and one method only. Rather diversify them. It is what is suggested also with itineraries, for example or meeting points, etc. So, the underlying logic of information management would be the general one: 'diversification' of means/habits/methods.

After all, a computer/ a usb flash disk can easily be stolen. As far as I understand there is software able open encrypted information. There are threats that can lead the hrd to speak and give information let alone, the human ‘distraction’.
There are obstacles that can be voluntarily put on the itenarary pf a hrd to force them choose another path...

Parties interested in hrds’ work have not waited for new technologies to get information on hrds or from hrds.

The collective decision should include people/victims that are in the information to be secured.
It is not only a technical procedure but also a procedure to take into account the psychological dimension: what is the risk tolerance of each hrd of a group? What is the organsiational policy about it? Imagine a hrd spoke under threat and was faced not only with the reality of exposing their colleagues and victims but also with a reaction such as ‘I would not have given in’… Guilt feeling and consequent symptoms would probably explode.
There are cases where in one same group you have hrd with a life insurance and those without: now, spontaneous reaction could be that those with insurance go further than the others...not necessarily, as insurance puts limits and conditions to 'covered risks' and therefore, non insured hrd might be expected to break the line...I have had the case in trainings where that was an issue.

The question is also ‘how far can the hrd go’? how is that decided give the possible impact of both loosing/giving information and not giving information?

A computer/usb/paper/photos (whether backed up or not) can easily be forgotten somewhere, stolen or handed to the potential aggressor by force. So I am not only speaking of ‘oral information’. Infiltrators might be in the organsiation...

What is the security policy towards those mentioned in the information stolen/lost?
Are they aware of the faillibility of tools and people or do they have ‘unrealistic expectations’ about whom they consider as their ' knowledgeable intermediaries'
Do hrds have 'unrealistic' expectations as to security measures (IT and not IT)?

These are questions that can be integrated in the reflection towards a security strategy, plan and management.

Marie

Marie Caraj's picture

Like a life boat

Dear Allen,

The concern I have is mostly that Linux is considered 'complicated'. what do you think?

Thanks

Marie

gunner's picture

Using Linux

Hey,

Great question. Linux is definitely different, but each new version of Linux, especially Ubuntu Linux*, is increasingly easy to use. We ran a laptop lab at the US Social Forum in June and offered nothing but Ubuntu, and no one complained.

But usability is a personal decision. I recommend you "play" with Linux and see what *you* think. You can get CDs or USB memory sticks with which you can start your computer and "test drive" Ubuntu without installing or affecting your existing setup. Glad to explain more.

Linux is worth the challenge, it's profoundly safer for defenders and others who need to be secure and anonymous.

* Linux comes in different configurations, which each have a name, such as Debian, Knoppix, and Ubuntu. Ubuntu is the "distribution" that has the most focus on usability and end user experience.

Allen Gunn
Executive Director, Aspiration / www.aspirationtech.org

Marie Caraj's picture

Using Linux

Thanks Allen. Your answer got me enthusiastic to the point that by mistake I wrote under subject: Using Allen...I corrected it as you can see.
Marie

r p ruiz's picture

Change Is Complicated

Hi Marie,

I was recently approached by a long-time Windows user who wanted to purchase a new laptop who asked my advice about what they should do.

My short suggestion was to either purchase a laptop with Ubuntu Linux or OS X installed on it.  This suggestion was met with scepticism and disbelief, and included a response along the lines of "but... that's different from what I'm used to".  I persisted, offering to only provide free support if they chose one or the other, but not Windows.

Three months after purchasing an Apple laptop (and nary a last-minute tech support question), I asked this person how they felt about the change away from something they were used to, and got a big surprise: "It's more or less the same, sometimes just as baffling as my old Windows computer, but I no longer even notice the difference."

I've also received similar responses from people who've adopted Ubuntu.

Since most of us are multingual, why can't we be multi-plaform literate?

My conclusion: It's the change that people are averse to, even if it's for the better.

Rick

p.s.: Since I made the switch from RedHat Linux to Ubuntu Linux, I'be been pretty impressed with the sense of collegiality (sp?) that I experienced in the numerous and helpful Ubuntu support forums.  And that's not something that the Linux community has always been known for ;-)

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

kantin's picture

Funders that specifically support security for defenders?

gunner wrote:

  • What can funders do? Stay anonymous when necessary. Stay humble. Stay out of the way. We all understand that funders need to demonstrate impact and justify investments to assuage upstream stakeholders and sustain brand, but when possible disassociate yourself from the work of defender grantees unless there is explicit tactical benefit in all directions. Encourage grantees to write security costs and corresponding organizational development into all grant proposals, and then fund it. Let grantees tell you what to say and what not say about their work, and when to say it. Be coachable, not aloof, in supporting your investments. :^)

I couldn't agree more, Gunner!  Are there funders who focus on helping human rights orgs with security that defenders can contact for assistance/training/funding? 

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

gunner's picture

Hmmm

I don't have any funders to suggest that aren't already well known to members of these discussions. Open Society Institute are wonderful funders, but they have very disciplined funding guidelines, so you need to be working on stuff in their programmatic focus. Hivos is also a very supportive organization, but again with substantial funding discipline. And depending on where you work, there are other excellent regional funders as well.

My main advice to those seeking funding for security (and technology in general) is to learn to include it as a line item(s) of *every* grant you write. Funders often have constraints that prevent them from straight-funding technology and "infrastructure" costs, but if it's a component of a larger proposal that falls within their funding parameters, that's got a chance.

I believe as NGOs and activists, we need to consistently assert to funders and other supply-side players the *real* technology and security costs incurred in doing the business of social change and social justice. It continues to frustrate me when I hear funders say "we don't fund technology" or "we don't fund infrastructure"; to me it's not a matter of covering optional components, it's a matter of supporting mission critical substrates.

Allen Gunn
Executive Director, Aspiration / www.aspirationtech.org

UAF Saira's picture

On What Funders Can Do

I agree with Gunner and Allen regarding the role of funders; and that 'security conscious' funders should encourage other funders to support security measures, be they tech infrastructure or secure transporation or disguise paraphernalia.  I suppose the mention of the latter seems a bit out of place in a discussion on tech security but one of our grant categories at Urgent Action Fund (UAF) is for the protection and security of threatened activists.  We have seen a range of security measures from horses for safe transport in rural areas, guard dogs, disguise paraphernalia to awareness raising campaigns for increased visibility and therefore increased security.  Of course, these are all context specific. 

Unfortunately because this is something that funders don't normally support, many grassroots orgs often don't consider including these items in their budgets.  There is also the consideration of security for self, not just the organization, which also often gets neglected. 

Then there's the question of sustainability.  Just how sustainable are short-term security measures in areas of protracted conflict or extreme surveillance?  It seems the more severe the state and its surveillance becomes, the more creative we (as activists/organizers) become in our methods of evading (or, rather, liberating ourselves from) it.  But how effective are these methods really?

I'd also like to add that some funders and international organizations could really benefit from being more security conscious.  We have unfortunately seen situations wherein it's the big international organization or funder and its behaviour (and lack of awareness regarding security culture) that compromises or jeopardizes the security of the folks at the grassroots level, be they grantees or participants at meetings or conferences.  There is a lived reality and different kind of consciousness that comes from being raised in, living in, or experiencing and being subjected to various types of oppressions.  Due to various forms of privilege, this reality or consciousness (particularly in the so-called global 'north/west') is not shared and often cannot be understood, imagined or conceptualized.  How to bridge this gap and increase honest communication when the power differential (and money) is involved? 

There is also the issue of where the money comes from.  What types of monitoring and evaluation methods or reporting requirements would foundations be subjected to when receiving money from say, the U.S. government?  How can we trust this?  I suppose ultimately, if they want to watch you, they will.  I've heard this time and time again and find it to be a bit fatalist and realist yet I can't say I don't believe it's true.

swillcox's picture

funding security tools

I agree with Allan.  We struggle to demonstrate the need for "administrative costs" when funders want only to fund "program" costs or activities.  Each funder defines these terms differently, but no matter, the difficulty of raising operating costs drives the cost of doing business as you promise to do more with less to pay those doing it.  

On a cost-saving side - we work with a  terrific organization that has an IT specialist who has traveled to us to train on ICT security techniques, etc. In the past we've paid for his travel (to NY) and provided the space at our offices to hold the trainings.  The rest of the costs were covered by him and -- I think -- the referral organization. I'm hesitant to post all the details here, but will gladly put everyone in touch if this is something of interest.  I will write more once I hear from him or the organization to know what I can share.  The point is, the lack of training may well be the obstacle to using many of the free or lower cost options out there.  If training comes pro bono or relatively cheaply, quite a lot can be learned and implemented. 

r p ruiz's picture

Like a lifeboat... And Any One of Us Can Sink It

Hi Allen,

Spot on with the lifeboat analogy!  Many of the Internet security trainings I lead are intermingled with team or coalition building workshops.  In this context I often emphasize the importance of our ethical obligation to protect not only ourselves, but also our family, friends and colleagues.  That's also accompanied by ongoing "Weakest Link" security analysis (that everybody's capable of on one level or another).

Just as we would never intentionally send our children out to buy bread in a "bad neighborhood", nor use postcards to transmit important project information, we also need to be mindful of where we're sending/storing our valuable information, and who has access to it.

It's this kind of human-and-not-technology-centric approach to risk analysis and mitigation that I find to be easily taught and important to cover before we ever get to discussing security tools.

Rick

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

nilsdybvig's picture

Providing political accompaniment to increase safety

I think it’s important to discuss the ways that networks of outside supporters can contribute to the security of HR defenders.  

The goal of accompaniment work that I have done is to create a safe space that will allow communities at risk of violence to organize.  In Colombia, teams travel to rural areas, often walking side-by-side with community organizers and human right workers, to provide a physical presence in communities at risk of violence.  Communities request our presence because they believe that when “eyes from outside” are watching, armed actors will be more reluctant to act, and the community will be somewhat protected from violence.  

Activists from another part of the country or  from abroad may not be able to set aside the time and money required to train for and carry out physical accompaniment in rural areas, but many of us can provide what has been termed “political accompaniment”.  A letter to a political leader, a public witness highlighting the struggle of a community facing violence, or providing public recognition of the work of human rights activists are all ways of providing political accompaniment.  Communities or human rights leaders whose work is recognized receive a real security benefit - the political costs of harming them increases if other people are watching.

What are some ways that all of us can build effective networks to support the security of human rights defenders?  What strategies have worked well in raising the political costs of harming HRDs?

Nils Dybvig
Christian Peacemaker Teams - Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz

kantin's picture

Accompaniment of human rights defenders

A few resources and ideas to add to this thread about accompaniment of human rights defenders...

New Tactics has written a tactical notebook titled Side by Side: Protecting and encouraging threatened activists with unarmed international accompaniment:

Since the mid-1980s, human rights groups and other activist organizations being targeted with repressive abuses have been calling on international NGOs to provide them with direct accompaniment by international field workers. These field workers – usually volunteers – spend twenty-four hours a day with threatened activists, at the premises of threatened organizations, in threatened communities or witnessing public events organized by threatened groups. The international presence serves as a deterrent against the use of violence. In order to ensure this deterrence, these international accompaniment organizations are part of transnational networks poised and ready to mobilize political pressure against perpetrators should their volunteers witness any attacks or should their clients be further threatened.

We've also hosted a tactical dialogue on unarmed accompaniment that included Nils, Michele and many other accompaniers.

Another type accompaniment that came up in our dialogue on the use of humor, was that of protecting demonstrators using a red nose and quick wits.  Demonstrators have dressed up as clowns to create a barrier between the police and the demonstrators - great idea, right?

I really like Nils' comment about accompaniment serving as a watchdog to raise the political costs of harming defenders.  It would be great to hear ideas to Nils' original questions - What are some ways that all of us can build effective networks to support the security of human rights defenders?  What strategies have worked well in raising the political costs of harming HRDs?

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

nilsdybvig's picture

Accompanying HRDs - a case example

Other people have more theoretical expertise, but I think a case example of how accompaniment (broadly defined) can provide visibility to HRDs and increase the political costs of harming them might be helpful, and may provoke more discussion.

In addition to physically accompanying HRDs, part of the work of Christian Peacemaker Teams involves bringing delegations of internationals to conflict zones around the world (see http://www.cpt.org/participate/delegation for more information).  These short-term (7-14 day) delegations are intended to educate people from the global North about specific conflicts and introduce them to HRDs and their work.

In Colombia one of the human rights organizations CPT accompanies is a federation of farmers and small-scale gold miners, who have been threatened with violent displacement, in part because of increased  interest in their land by multinational gold companies.   One delegation was hosted in cooperation with the mining federation, which took a small group of delegates from the U.S. and Canada to visit rural Colombian mining communities, meet with many small-scale miners and farmers, and learn first-hand about their struggles.  

An important part of CPT delegations is public action.  At the end of the mining delegation, after learning first hand of the concerns of  the mining communities and community leaders the delegates planned a public witness in the plaza in front of the Gold Museum in Bogota, to draw attention to these concerns.  This public witness was carried out with participation from the mining federation and from several other Colombian HR organizations.  At the end of the public witness, the delegates led a procession through the streets of Bogota to deliver a letter to the office of the Colombian president, asking for attention to Human Rights in the development of future mining agreements.  Copies of the letter were also sent to the political leaders of Canada, Great Britain, South African and the United States; other countries which are involved in the expansion of Colombian gold mining.

I think this kind of accompaniment accomplishes a number of things:

  1. It educates and establishes strong connections between the North American delegates and Colombian HRDs,
  2. It serves to raise the visibility of the HR organizations receiving accompaniment, and
  3. It decreases the isolation of HRDs    

These connections may continue bearing fruit as delegates return to their home communities with new information and commitment to advocate for changes in foreign policy or advocate for international pressure on governments which are not protecting Human Rights.

I think all of these benefits serve to increase the HRDs security by increasing the political costs of harming the HRDs whose work has been highlighted by the delegation.  What other types of network-building efforts have been successful in increasing the safety of HRDs? 

Nils Dybvig
Christian Peacemaker Teams - Equipos Cristianos de Acción por la Paz

edna.aquino's picture

Protection /Prevention: An integrated security strategy

I find that most of the existing responses on 'security/ safety' by HRD advocacy and support groups centre on the 'protection' measures and tend to be more on the 'reactive' side - either to pre-empt the imminent threats or after the incidents such as attacks, arrests, detention had already taken place.The WHRD Coalition has identified a number of these 'protection' measures and AWID is currently  conducting a study on the effectiveness of these responses.

  1. Urgent Appeals
  2. Working with / through the various UN and regional human rigts mechanisms  most particularly the  United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders (SR on HRDs). 
  3. Temporary relocation. This is about relocating defenders who are facing immediate risk as a result of their human rights work
  4. Trial observation. Having external observers as a form of protection to the defender and to let the judge and prosecutor know that there is international scrutiny. In countries where judges and lawyers do not feel well protected, it provides them with a potential layer of protection.
  5. Legal assistance.
  6. Psycho-social and medical social
  7. Emergency grants and relief programs.
  8. Fellowships - could be tied in with temporary relocation.
  9. Solidarity and monitoring visits.

10. Stress management program.

11. Safe houses. 

12. Emergency Hotline

Perhaps it's also timely to examine the relationship beween 'security' and 'protection'?  It may seem pretty obvious but there might be some nuances that are worth capturing in this conversation. For isntance, what I find very interesting and impressive in the contributions by colleagues working in the area of ICT and security is the role that this could play on the 'preventive' side which, I think, is still very much underdeveloped in existing 'protection' responses as outlined above. The consciousness-raising amongst HRDs and their organisations about their personal well-being and security as an integral part of their public roles as HRDs is another area where 'preventive' strategy could be further developed and supported. 

Edna O. Aquino

"Violence is not our culture"/ Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women

 

Ali Palh's picture

Few more protection measures

Hi Edna,

Few more measures,

Accompaniments from one safe place to other safe place by international (s) or influential national (religious leaders, lawyers).

Diffusion of threat by approaching to sources of threat (Someone who has influence over the  Source of threat)

Protective presence at HRDs offices, homes by internationals or  influential nationals.

Working as intern/volunteer with an UN/other international institution within country or even with national institutions like Human Rights commission or Ombudsman office also deter/reduce the threat

Admission in courses (journalism, law etc) where hrds can stay in boarding or campus where vice chancellor , dean or other university officials regularly monitor hrds situation. These tactics are proved very useful in contexts where threats were from non-state, illegal actors or state/legal actors wanted to perform illegally.

Regular Diplomat's visits of the area also play important role in improving the over all security

 

 

Ali Palh

kantin's picture

We all play a role in protecting human rights defenders

Thank you Edna and Ali for this list of possible protection measures for defenders to explore!  I found these two particularly interesting - ideas that I hadn't thought of before:

  • Working as intern/volunteer with an UN/other international institution within country or even with national institutions like Human Rights commission or Ombudsman office also deter/reduce the threat
  • Admission in courses (journalism, law etc) where hrds can stay in boarding or campus where vice chancellor , dean or other university officials regularly monitor hrds situation. These tactics are proved very useful in contexts where threats were from non-state, illegal actors or state/legal actors wanted to perform illegally.

Reading these ideas help me to better understand just how holistic an effective 'security' strategy can be.  The role of an international human rights orgs does not necessary have to be funding or training - instead its role can be that of a watchdog, by staying in regular contact with defenders via internships, volunteer positions, etc.  The term 'watchdog' has been brought up in this dialogue in other threads and now I am really starting to understand how a network of watchdogs can be created - universities, UN offices, human rights orgs, etc.  Thank you for all of these ideas!

Kristin Antin, New Tactics Online Community Builder

Michele Braley's picture

connecting HRDs to a global community through ICT

Greetings,

As I have been following the conversation about internet and communication technology (ICT) I find myself thinking about the human rights defenders around the globe who are not yet connected to this network - due to lack of electricity, no phone service, or no computer availability.  As we rely more heavily on these technologies for security, how do we help the most isolated, and therefore most vulnerable, of the HRDs, increase their safety.   In response to Edna's post which, as I understand it,  differentiates between "accompaniment" and the protective response of ICT, for some communities these responses are intertwined.  Its the relationships with international human rights defenders that connects isolated communities to ICT. This can be in a preventive AND reactive response - without the international NGO's access to ICT, there are isolated communities that would be less effective in getting information to people who can use it to change laws, increase visibility of the work of HRDs and exert pressure on decision makers regarding specific human rights violations.

edna.aquino wrote:

 

Perhaps it's also timely to examine the relationship beween 'security' and 'protection'?  It may seem pretty obvious but there might be some nuances that are worth capturing in this conversation. For isntance, what I find very interesting and impressive in the contributions by colleagues working in the area of ICT and security is the role that this could play on the 'preventive' side which, I think, is still very much underdeveloped in existing 'protection' responses as outlined above. The consciousness-raising amongst HRDs and their organisations about their personal well-being and security as an integral part of their public roles as HRDs is another area where 'preventive' strategy could be further developed and supported. 

Michele Braley

United States

Marie Caraj's picture

Connecting hrd to a global community through ICT

Hello,

Going back to defenders who might not have access to technologies and adding the consideration that they might perceive themselves in a more vulnerable situation than those who have access to ICT.

Some Assumptions:
. vulnerabilities and capacities are two faces of the same coin
. the immensity and evolving possibilities in security and protection tools, texts, mechanisms etc for hrd
. sometimes we do things that do not necessarily relate to the objective
(ex. Look for the money/pictures/souvenirs, etc before running out of the house during an earthquake (while the 'security' objective is to stay alive and any action holding us back is 'counterproductive'/'useless' from the security objective point of view), etc.
Etc.

I think the question: 'what for? (What is the objective and how is the objective going to increase 'my' security'?) can help the hrd choose the 'useful' element/action from the many tools, measures etc at hrds' disposal.

I am thinking about all the hrd who currently do not have access to telecommunication (tel /internet etc) and that may think that because of that they are more exposed than others, based on the assumption that tel is fundamental instead of ‘a tool part of a more elaborated preventive/reactive security strategy etc)

They are exposed in a different way. Neither more or less than others with a phone.

What is fundamental is the 'critical thinking; the risk analysis and its updating, asking the right questions that help spot the cause instead of the symptom and is also 'solution-oriented"

Example: Real case (partial summary):
"A defender is attacked at night, at home. Defender has got a phone and calls for help. Help arrives in very, very short time and defender is ok".

Assumption: Phone saved defender's life. Phone is fundamental.

In the analysis conducted after, what came out was that:
- Defender had been away for some days before that night. Some unidentified people came to neighbourhood looking for defender's home. They found the home and asked the partner about the defender. (security incidents)
- Partner told defender is not there and also told when defender be back (security incidents)
- Partner forgot to tell defender. (Security incident)
-
Aggression happened after that progression of security incidents (Aggression is the culmination of a process)

If defender had known, defender might not have been at home that night.
Luckily:
* defender had a phone (charged and with credit);
* defender's friend hadn’t switch off phone at night
* they both lived next to each other
* a police patrol 'happened' to pass there to scare off the aggressors...

A lot of lucky circumstances (that might not repeat next time) instead of ‘thought out security strategy and plan’

Phone needed to be used before:

Partner to defender to tell what had happened and say don't come home or plan b or etc

Some organisations have got emergency lines. From the prevention point of view, defenders need to use it well before an event. Example, if defender had been informed by partner and had used the emergency line before going home, defender might have had support either to 'hide' or to have accompaniment or etc.

If the event happens and the defender can use the line, there will be reaction, not prevention. Yet, unless the reaction happens there and then, (local level/immediate) defender might not be there anymore.

In the real case above, defender ignored the analysis as partner didn't want to spend some nights away from home...aggressors came back that very night...defender still lucky (manage to run away)...

Other perspective of phone calls and security:

I agree a phone is a plus and hrds need to implement security when using the phone.
Depending on the security objective of its use, hrd could reduce the exposure to undue stress if, for example, hrd do not have access to secure phones.
I meet so many hrds who believe that because they don't have access to certain technologies (IT sceurity), they are more exposed than others. They simply forget the other face of the coin and that the potential aggressor has not waited for electronic technology etc (in fact, most of it has been developed by the potential aggressor).
Defenders forget the fundamental variable of the human behaviour which determines whether the phone will be a vulnerability or a capacity.

Examples (non exhaustive and partial)

A. emergency:

Unless the phone call can save the hrd (call and 'rescue reaction' triggered 'on time'), the hrd will probably have to do something else first that has a greater impact on their security (ex: scream to alert neighbours, run...).
Later, the hrd should analyse the facts (what really happened?). Hrd would probably reach the conclusion and that if security and protection had been implemented preventively, they might have not been there at the moment of emergency... (wrong place at the wrong time). Of course there many other variables)

B. if the point of hrd’s phone call is to let interlocutor know that hrd has arrived safely at home, hrd doesn't necessarily need extra measures knowing that:
- phones can be located (so potential aggressor knows where hrd is / or potential aggressor has picked the call from the interlocutor phone, thus they have heard the hrd, etc or simply, the hrd house is being watched, hrd is being followed, etc. Most probably the defender has not taken the battery off the tel so potential aggressor has just followed the 'red spot' on the map).
Let alone the fact that the hrd security will also depend on the house security...habits etc
In other words, the phone call is one element of the security.

C. communication of sensitive information over the phone':

Questions that can help choose the mean of communication:
. Is it 'vital' for the recipient to have it right now?
. Can it wait and travel differently?
. How much information over the phone etc

All that doesn't absolutely mean that security tech for phones should not be used, on the contrary. It needs to be used, as a safer alternative at a moment in time.
(Assumption: habits expose the defenders and must therefore be avoided)
Again, just thinking about hrd who simply do not have a secure phone and might not have it soon. They have already so many reasons to be stressed to have to add one more (stress has an impact on security).

Marie

mjs07j's picture

Organizations that support the protection of HRDs

Another way we can support the protection of human rights defenders is through organizations that focus specifically on this area. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders is a joint program by the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). The Observatory mobilizes the international community and the media as protection agents for HRDs. In addition, they also provide emergency protection to HRDs in the field through urgent actions notifications and material assistance. They also produce regular reports (such as their recent fact-finding mission report on the situation of human rights defenders in Nigeria) and an annual publication, Steadfast in Protest, which highlights issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.

What other groups focus specifically in this area? What opportunities for involvement are there?

Margaret Spicer

Midwest Coalition for Human Rights Summer Fellow

Center for Victims of Torture

Marie Caraj's picture

how to draft and manage security policies, plans and policies

Generally speaking, policies, plans and protocols are based on risk analysis. In Part I of its New Protection Manual for hrd -NPMHRD-, PI suggests a sequence of steps to get to the actual elaboration of security strategy, plan and protocols.

Drafting them is of course not enough as they need to be implemented, managed, updated. The process requires also ownership by hrds

A difficulty might be where to start from as hrds are not starting from zero and the security experience of hrds working with a same organisation is not even.

In Part II of NPMHRD, PI suggests steps to improve security management starting with assessing organisational security performance (in fact, it can apply to the single hrd too).
The implementation of the security wheel can be regarded as the starting point of security process towards improved security management.

In Part III of NPMHRD, PI suggests some examples of policies and protocols.

Marie

Marie Caraj's picture

How can we effectively train staff on security policies?

On behalf of PI, I have been giving security/protection trainings to hrds for several years. So I can share PI's perception.

As all the rest, there is no one single answer. PI prefers to speak of training, counselling, providing induction, coaching etc as each action can potential lead to the same final result and requires different skills. Thus, it multiplies the possibilities and opportunities for hrds to share their security knowledge and induce positive organsiational changes as far as security as concerned.
Example, several students could attend the same class on history yet not all of them will carry out the same profession. Some could be researchers, teachers, historians, carpenters etc. It depends on their motivations, interets, passions, opportunities,concerns, etc. Some might not feel at ease speaking to a group yet they would be excellent conveyors on a one to one level, etc.

So, training has multiple facets than can include, but not necessarily, 'conducting' a training to a group, to members of an organisation.

Yet, some form of training/consultancy is necessary and the security wheel (New Protection Manual for hrd by PI) can help determine whether there is 'in-house' skills to give the training to all organisational members or if the organsiation need to rely partially or totally on an external consultant, etc.
Whatever the choice is, expectations in terms of results should be realistic.

Realistically speaking, a training can achieve awareness, knowledge, seldom the necessary change in attitude implemented 'as long as necessary'.
In other words, after a training, in case of a security problem, the defender will probably be aware of what they should have done instead of having implemented the acquired knowledge of the training to prevent and reduce the probability of the risk and/or its consequences (as a risk is never equal to zero).
So, the actual work comes after the training and requires time to be dedicated to its follow up and permanent management to update the whole security level of an organisation. Each time a new member joins the organisation (just to mention one variable), the 'security level' of the organisation is 'jeopardised'. Unless the new comer is trained, the whole security level of the organisation would be closer to his/her level than the level of the rest of the organisation. This is based on the following assumption: a potential aggressor will/can try to go through the the weakest point, therefore the organsiational security is equal to the organisation's weakest point. Let alone the variable of the so called 'unintentional' behaviour of the hrds.

In the light of the many options illustrated above, PI believes that realistic objectives of security trainings are awareness and knowledge. Depending on the participants' skills, some will be able to transfer the acquired knowledge on an individual basis or to a group, in a training format o in a consultancy/conversation format etc.
All forms can potentially lead to an improved security management for the organisations. The improved management comes after the training.
Thus, the training/consultancy/induction/coaching etc, could be conceived with the above 'realistic objectives'.

Thinking also in terms of coaching/consultancy/one to one convesration etc doesn't take a gram away from the topic. PI conceives its training like taht also and its training is equivalent to what is generally called Training of Trainers –ToT.
However, PI does not call its trainings ToT as PI believes that a ToT is either a training (transfer of topic only) given to proven trainers (homogenous group of people with pedagogic and methodological training skills) or a training for people who want to become trainers (heterogeneous group of people. Transfer of methodology and pedagogical skills, before they acquire the content of the security/protection management. This a far longer process than a week training which is 'usually' enough to reach awareness and fundamental knowledge on security.

In other words, an organisation could decide to have a whole week of training for the whole staff and/or members either resorting to a member who has attended a security training or has acquired systematic and systemitised knowledge by individual reading/researching; or arrange for one day a week repeated within an extended timeline with the whole staff/members, or proceed per unit of work with a smaller group, etc.

In the New Protection Manual for HRD, PI makes several references to 'trainig' taking into account the multiple its multiple facets.

My comment doesn't tackle the 'how" question proper yet I hope it opens realistic and adaptable perspectives for different organisations and contexts.

Marie

r p ruiz's picture

Effective Training = Learning to Think Critically About Security

I appreciate Marie's take on focusing on the most realistic of the multiple possible outcomes of any given "training".

The following are few personal observations on the "how" of effective (Internet) security training in general:

After leading numerous workshops on Internet security in the last few years to HRDs of widely varying capacities, experiences, and interests, I've finally settled on giving the ability to think critically about security my highest priority.  Towards this end I often use a modified socratic dialog approach to level the perceived difference between expert and student, and also to help bring participants to the conclusion that they know more about security (in general) than they would usually give themselves credit for.

Given the disparities in computer skills represented by workshop participants, it's been my experience that thinking critically about security is more easily taught than specific security skills.  Not only does focusing on this outcome (while simultaneously providing multiple practical hands-on segments) help to provide particpants in my workshops with "rules of thumb" (analytic concepts) and tools they can use immediately, but also more importantly, it empowers and provides them with tools and strategies that don't become obsolete in the next upgrade cycle.

Here are a number of important concepts that are introduced and reinforced in my workshops:  https://www.vaultletsoft.com/ppt/ses-pdp-refresh/img2.html. 

Emphasizing the importance of critical thinking and continually reapplying a handful of valuable security concepts does not necessarily mean that I eschew teaching specific skills to HRDs and their support organizations, but it does preceed any and all of our hands-on workshop segments, so that participants now understand what they'll get (and more importantly NOT get) after working through the twenty something steps it takes, for instance, to create a hidden encrypted TrueCrypt partition: https://www.vaultletsoft.com/ppt/truecrypt-hidden-volumes/img3.html. 

There are two additional advantages to continual reinforcement of fundamental concepts and analytic practices via a socratic approach: The first is that HRDs who would self-describe themselves as "all thumbs" when it comes to computers often find that they are actually quite good at thinking critically about security; this reinforces their self-esteem and consequently increases their involvement with the subject at hand while minimizing the cognitive gap that they've got to bridge in order to assimilate workshop content.

The second advantage to this approach is that they see for themselves that good security is an ongoing process.  They also come to their own conclusion that good security is also relative to their own context and tolerance for risk.

Rick

p.s.: This is an interesting set of conversations - 'wish I had more time to dedicate to following and participating in them.

 

 

 

President, VaultletSoft https://www.vaultletsoft.com and Project Autonomy http://www.valeso.org

Marie Caraj's picture

What can the rest of us need to do to protect defenders?

Hello Everyone,

Through this dialogue on the many interrelated items, many aspects have been 'touched' and support references and publications given. We can't speak of details. Yet, basically all items evoked in the dialogue require deeper exchange of 'critical thinking' and experiences. Emblematic cases that resolved both in 'happy' and drammatic ending and ongoing emblematic cases would be a way to help answer the question of 'what can the rest of us to to support defenders'. There are specific contexts that could be further explored, like:
- the one in which defenders in Israel and Palestine are (evoked by Louis Frankenthaler: Protecting HRDs beyond physical violence)
- the one in Kyrgyzstan and other places
- defenders and victims and witnesses
- etc

to try and contribute to answering the question and maybe see whether some objectives are out of reach for defenders in case some fundamental conditions are not met first.

The 'rest of us' doesn't correspond to an homogenuous and compact/cohesion group. I believe we would need to split it up in its different components. On www.protectionline.org, PI has subdivided some of the 'rest of us' in some of its elements according to profiles and mandates in protection of defenders.
According to me, the 'rest of us' means also the wider group under 'public opinion' which is not necessarily aware of the existence of defenders and active civil societies in countries torn by war, impunity, etc. Yet, the defenders actions need support from the wider public opinion. The latter represents the majority of a country. Public opinion hardly hear about defenders in Israel and Palestine. It mostly hears of Israeli army and Palestian kamikazes who are a very small percentage of the population in those countries.

I think raising public awareness about the existence of defenders and active civil society is one of the ojectives that can help get closer to the next one: civil mobilsation for defenders and thus, closer to the more global one of 'protected defenders'

That requires the support and contribution of mass media...

What could be done to get mass media coverage of defenders and active civil societies around the world?

How can the public opinion become aware of the power it really has in supporting defenders (and itself as defenders represent groups of victims part of the public opinion/citizens)?

If the Field Forces analysis is implemented (New protection Manual for hrd by PI), one could say that:

Most of the time, the citizens/public opinion constitute the forces of unknown direction that defenders would need to mobilise before the 'resisting forces' coopt them.
The 'rest of us' includes also the rest of defenders. And the rest of defenders are alreay aware of many of the steps that could be taken although they face resisting forces.
The rest of defenders and genuine key stakeholders constitute the supporting forces.

Marie

Ali Palh's picture

factors in hrds' protection

Does Human Rights Defender who live in remote area has the same level of access to protection mechanisms as compare to those who live in capitals?

Similarly education, class and relationship (marriage, affair, friendship) of hrd with influential people play important role in  his/her protection?

My experience says YES for all. What are your thoughts? 

Ali Palh

Marie Caraj's picture

factors in hrds' protection

I think that in the case of defenders living in remote areas, I would say the context might make it a little more laborous if they are also 'isolated'. To get access to protection mechanisms one needs to be known by key stakeholders which include also other hrd. Defenders living in remote areas need to build/gain access to hrd networks (it is not a definite pre-condition, yet it helps).One could compare it with the case of defenders who have relationship with i
influential people: it helps, yet it is not a pre-condition.
There are some many other contextual variables that have an influence.
So, yes, potentially both groups can ahve same access to protection mechanisms.

Ali Palh's picture

Multi-directional and dimensional threat to HRDs

Multi-dir threats

Ali Palh

Ali Palh's picture

HRD Support Network

Ali Palh

Ali Palh's picture

Thanks Marie , thats true its

Thanks Marie , thats true its not pre-condition but it helps....

Ali Palh

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